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To help reduce the overall cost of health care in the Military Health Services System, 
Managed Care Support Contracts include a provision known as Resource Sharing. Resource 
Sharing Agreements allow the contractor to provide personnel, equipment, or supplies to a 
military treatment facility to improve its capability to deliver health care. After reviewing 
civilian managed care programs, this thesis examines the Military Health Services System and 
its new managed care program known as TRICARE. Then the concept of Resource Sharing 
is examined and the process for identifying, evaluating, and using cost-effective Resource 
Sharing Agreements is discussed. Case studies of different types of agreements are used to 
illustrate the complexity and importance of cost and workload estimates and key contract 
factors in understanding the agreements. The findings suggest that the contractor's and 
government's performance data and assumptions underlying the agreements should be 
continuously monitored to ensure the cost-effectiveness ofthe agreements. 
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The Military Health Services System (MHSS) is one of the nation's largest health care 
systems, offering health benefits to about 8.3 million people and costing over $15 billion 
annually. Its primary mission is to maintain the health of 1. 7 million active duty service 
personnel and to be prepared to deliver health care during times of war. Also, as an 
employer, the Department of Defense (DOD) offers health care services to 6.6 million 
nonactive-duty beneficiaries. These services are provided through a system of medical 
centers, smaller hospitals, and clinics worldwide, and through a DOD administered insurance-
like program called the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services 
(CHAMPUS). (GAO Report, 1995) 
Like the civilian marketplace, the United States uniformed services are reforming their 
health care system. This is due in large part to DOD experiencing many of the same 
challenges facing the national health care system such as, increasing costs, uneven access to 
health care services, and disparate benefit and cost sharing packages for similarly situated 
categories of beneficiaries. In response to these challenges, DOD initiated, with 
Congressional authority, a series of demonstration programs around the country designed to 
explore various alternatives by which it could more effectively manage the care it provides 
and funds (GAO Report, 1995). These demonstration projects led DOD, in 1993, to begin 
a nationwide managed care program, called TRICARE. 
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The TRICARE program was developed to ensure the most effective execution of the 
military health care mission, ensure access to a quality health care benefit, control health care 
costs, and respond to rapidly changing military and national health care priorities (Lamar, 
1994). The program is specifically designed to assist military treatment facility commanders 
in optimizing their resources in providing comprehensive health care coverage to eligible 
beneficiaries. The program is being implemented nationwide in twelve Health Service 
Regions (HSR). Each region will has a Lead Agent Military Treatment Facility/Commander. 
Lead Agents are will communicate and work in concert with the regional MTF commanders, 
as well as Service headquarters' staff and Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Health Affairs OASD(HA) to support the Military Health Services System (MHSS) mission 
(OASD(HA), 1995). At the heart of TRICARE are the Managed Care Support Contracts 
(MCSC) for each region. The MCSC contracts are centrally procured by the TRICARE 
Support Office (TSO). The MCSC supplements the capabilities of the MTF through the 
establishment of civilian provider networks. 
In an effort to reduce overall government cost of health care under this MCSC a 
feature was placed in the contract which allows the government to enter into Resource 
Sharing Agreements (RSAs) with the contractor. This provision, known as Resource Sharing 
(RS), allows the contractor and MTF to work together in improving the utilization of the 
MTF's resources and recapturing TRICARE workload, previously known as CHAMPUS. 
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B. OBJECTIVES OF THE THESIS 
This thesis involves the evaluation of Resource Sharing Agreements (RSA) as they 
are now used under the MCSC. It will entail an analysis and comparison of how RSAs are 
identified, evaluated, and implemented in accordance with current policy through the use of 
case study examples of actual RSAs. It will provide the reader with a thorough understanding 
ofRSAs and their role in optimizing MTF utilization and decreasing TRICARE/CHAMPUS 
costs. Specifically, this thesis will describe the process for developing an RSA with emphasis 
on information requirements, sources of data, and determining cost-effectiveness through the 
use of the Financial Analysis Worksheet. The reader should have a good understanding of 
this worksheet and how the selected inputs affect the overall outcome. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis will examine how RSAs are being utilized within the MHSS by the MTFs 
and the Managed Care Support Contractor and how these agreements are evaluated for cost-
effectiveness. The primary research question addresses the following: What is the current 
process for identifying, evaluating, and utilizing RSAs and how do RSAs affect the costs of 
the Managed Care Support Contract?. In addition to the primary research question, four 
subsidiary questions will be answered. Specifically, they are: 
• What are the roles of the MTF, Contractor, and Lead Agent in the RSA process? 
• What are the key factors and assumptions utilized in the Financial Analysis 
Worksheet when evaluating an RSA for cost-effectiveness? 
• What is meant by "workload credit" and how does this concept affect the Managed 
Care Support Contract costs? 
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• What are the key differences in the types of RSAs and how they affect the 
evaluation process? 
D. DELIMITATIONS 
Due to the newness of the MCSCs there was not a lot of data on RSAs and time did 
not permit an exhaustive survey of actual practices. Therefore, this thesis will focus on 
disguised examples ofRSAs from specific regions within the :MHSS. The case examples are 
representative of the factors and issues that impact RSAs. While the policies and procedures 
are the same for implementing RSAs across all of the regions, the potential uses may differ 
across regions as a result of different managed care support contractors, size of MTFs, 
location, enrolled population, and civilian provider's experience with managed care. In 
addition, due to the recent development of this concept, methods are continually being refined 
for evaluating RSAs by OASD(HA) and support staff This thesis will concentrate on the 
methods and experiences used by the Health Service Regions at the time of evaluation. 
E. SCOPE OF THESIS 
This thesis will examine the feature in the Managed Care Support Contract known as 
Resource Sharing through an extensive literature review, and analysis and comparison of 
RSAs through case study examples. It will focus on the development ofRSAs and the role 
of the MTF, Contractor, and Lead Agent in this process. Emphasis will be placed on the 
evaluation ofRSAs for cost-effectiveness to the government and the contractor. We will 
provide an in depth examination of the Financial Analysis Worksheet (FA W) and the critical 
factors which make it up. 
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F. METHODOLOGY 
To provide the background information on practices and policies for using RSAs we 
will examine the existing literature on RSAs from the OASD(HA), Kennell and Associates, 
various Lead Agent briefings, and the managed care support contracts. Personal interviews 
will also be conducted with key personnel at OASD(HA), Kennell and Associates (an 
OASD(HA) contractor), the Lead Agent, and the MCS contractor to gain their insight and 
perspective into the current policy and use of RSAs. Actual field visits will be made to 
Kennell and Associates and the Lead Agent to collect the necessary data and information for 
this study. Because of the recent implementation of RSAs it was not possible to use 
questionnaires or surveys for this research. 
G. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
This thesis is composed of five chapters. This chapter provides the introduction, 
which includes the background and a basic overview of the subject matter, the objectives, 
research questions, scope and methodology that will be used to address the research 
questions. Chapter II provides a background on the .MHSS, civilian managed care programs, 
and the TRICARE/CHAMPUS program. Chapter III describes RSAs under Department of 
Defense, Health Affairs and the MCS Contract policy. Chapter IV discusses the application 
of RSAs using sample case studies. Chapter V provides discussion, the summary, 




This Chapter will focus on civilian managed care programs, background of the 
Military Health Services System, and the DOD's managed health care program known as 
TRICARE. 
A. CIVILIAN MANAGED CARE PROGRAMS 
The first "managed care" programs can be traced to health maintenance organizations 
(HMO), previously known as prepaid group practice plans. An HMO is a formally organized 
system that integrates the delivery and financing of health care services. It provides a 
comprehensive range of services through designated providers to an enrolled population, 
usually for a prepaid fixed price. The HMO concept stresses a close relationship among 
patients and their physician that provides incentive to both parties to minimize expensive 
medical treatment. In an HMO emphasis is placed on preventive care as opposed to acute 
care, which is emphasized under the traditional fee for service insurance (Borglum, 1994). 
An estimated 50 million Americans received care through health maintenance organizations 
(HMO) in 1994. This was an increase of 5 million over the previous year and an increase of 
21. 5 million over the number of HMO members in 1986, according to the Group Health 
Association of America (GHAA). GHAA expects HMO coverage to reach 56 million 
Americans in 1995. 
Preferred Provider Organizations (PPO) are another managed care type plan. PPOs 
are slightly different than HMOs. A PPO is a managed care plan which contracts with a select 
group of participating providers. Typically, participating providers in PPOs agree to abide 
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by utilization management criteria and agree to accept the PPO's reimbursement structure and 
payment levels. PPO coverage typically permits members to use non-PPO providers, 
although higher levels of coinsurance or deductibles apply to services provided by these non-
participating providers. (Borglum, 1994) 
Health Services Organizations (HSO) that provide "managed care" are commonly 
called "managed care plans." Managed care plans are characterized by the following: 
• Offer one or more products that integrate financing and management with delivery 
of health services to an enrolled population 
• Are responsible for delivering services (using their HSO or through contractual 
arrangements) and (as network or as individual providers) either share financial 
risk and/ or have some incentive to deliver efficient services 
• Use an information system capable of monitoring and evaluating patterns of 
utilization and financial outlays (Hale, 1988) 
Another element of managed care that has greatly influenced the DOD is capitation. 
Capitation is a method of reimbursement where a fixed amount of payment per patient, per 
period oftime is paid to a health care provider. Capitation is usually expressed in units of per 
member per month and may be varied by such factors as the age and sex of the enrolled 
member. The provider is responsible for delivering or arranging for the delivery of all health 
services required by the covered person under the condition of the provider contract. 
(Borglum, 1994) 
The concept of capitation is an important strategy for containing the cost of health 
care. Under a capitation system, the provider assumes responsibility for providing health 
services to a defined population, for a fixed amount per beneficiary regardless of the amount 
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of health services used. There is no financial incentive under a capitation methodology to 
inappropriately increase the number of services or to provide more costly care than is 
clinically appropriate. Because a capitated allocation system makes the provider responsible 
for providing all health services, there are built in incentives for care to be provided in the 
most cost effective setting--the use of preventive services, the efficient delivery of each 
episode of care, and the careful monitoring of the volume of provided services. Capitation 
discourages inappropriate hospital admissions, excessive lengths of stay, and unnecessary 
services. 
These developments in the civilian health care industry motivated DOD officials to 
pursue some of these innovative approaches to health care delivery in reforming DOD Health 
Care. 
B. MILITARY HEALTH SERVICES SYSTEM 
The MHSS Strategic Plan defines the MHSS mission as follows, 
To provide top quality health services, wherever needed in support of 
military operations, and to members of the Armed Forces, their families, and 
others entitled to DOD health care. 
As the mission statement reveals the :MHSS has a dual mission, the wartime readiness 
mission and the peacetime benefit mission. The current readiness mission consists of ensuring 
that military medicine is prepared to provide support for two major regional conflicts, 
contingency operations, police actions, humanitarian efforts, or disaster relief The peacetime 
benefit mission consists of providing health care to all eligible beneficiaries: active duty 
members, active duty family members, retirees, and retiree family members. The MHSS does 
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not have the personnel or MTF capacity to meet both of these missions simultaneously. As 
a result the lVIHSS is made up of two components, the direct care system and the indirect care 
system known as the TRlCARE program. 
1. Direct Care System 
The direct care system of the MHSS consists of over 600 military treatment facilities 
including 127 military hospitals and 504 clinics. These facilities take care of the active duty 
population, and if "space" permits the care of active duty family members, retirees and their 
family members. In addition, these facilities provide the training ground to ensure that 
military medical personnel are capable to perform their readiness mission. 
To gain a better understanding of how the direct care system works a little more 
background information is needed on eligibility and the process for using military treatment 
facilities. Eligibility for care is determined through the use of the Defense Enrollment 
Eligibility System (DEERS). All beneficiaries must be enrolled in DEERS in order to receive 
care in military treatment facilities, or to have claims processed through TRlCARE. 
Active duty individuals have first priority at all MTFs. They receive free medical care, 
including hospitalization, pharmaceuticals, immunizations, regular physical examinations and 
dental care. As a result of the new TRICARE program the priority system for care of others 
at MTFs has changed. In the past the order was active duty, active duty family members, 
retirees and their family members. Under the TRICARE program active duty still remain first 
priority, second priority goes to active duty family members or retirees and their family 
members who are participants in the TRlCARE Prime option. Priority then goes to active 
duty family members not enrolled in Prime and last priority goes to retirees and their family 
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members respectively. The~e is no cost to beneficiaries seen in the MTF as an outpatient and 
only meal charges are assessed for non-active duty inpatients. 
MTF commanders are responsible for the delivery of health care to all eligible 
beneficiaries within their catchment area. The catchment area is defined as the 40 mile radius 
of an MTF. Eligible beneficiaries that reside in an MTF' s catchment area must use that MTF 
for nonemergency inpatient care and 14 outpatient care procedures. If your designated MTF 
cannot provide the inpatient or outpatient care a nonavailability statement (NAS) is issued. 
A NAS is a certification from an MTF stating that the care is necessary and cannot be 
provided by the MTF. This statement authorizes the beneficiary to receive care under the 
TRICARE/CHAMPUS program. Beneficiaries must have a nonavailability statement prior 
to receiving care at a civilian treatment facility, otherwise TRICARE/CHAMPUS may not 
share in the cost. 
Taking care of family members in MTFs assists in meeting the MHSS readiness 
requirements. Since the active duty population is relatively healthy and the MTF is DOD's 
peacetime medical training ground it is imperative that military providers experience an 
adequate case-mix of medical procedures to maintain and improve their skills. In the direct 
care system there is an overlap ofboth the readiness and benefit mission. However, MHSS 
capacity does not meet the entire peacetime benefit mission so the indirect care system was 
developed to bridge the gap between MTF capacity and beneficiary requirements. 
2. Indirect Care System 
The origins of military medical care for the families of active duty members of the 
uniformed services dates back to the late 1700s. The following statement supports the early 
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policy: "Medical Officers of the Army and contract surgeons shall whenever practicable 
attend the families of the officers and soldiers free of charge."(Army Appropriations Act, 
1884). There was very little change in this policy until World War II. Most draftees in that 
war were young men who had wives of child-bearing age. The military medical care system, 
which was on a wartime footing, couldn't handle the large number ofbirths, nor the care of 
very young children. 
In 1943, Congress authorized the Emergency Maternal and Infant Care Program 
(EMIC). EMIC provided for maternity care and the care of infants up to one year of age for 
wives and children of service members in the lower pay grades. It was administered by the 
"Children's Bureau" through state health departments. (OCHAMPUS, 1996) 
The Korean conflict again strained the capabilities of the military health care system. 
In 1956, the Dependents Medical Care Act was signed into law, effective Dec. 7, 1956. The 
1966 amendments to this act created the current CHAMPUS program, authorizing 
ambulatory and psychiatric care for active duty family members, effective October 1, 1966. 
Retirees, their family members, and certain surviving family members were brought into the 
program on January 1, 1967. (OCHAMPUS, 1996) The CHAMPUS program was basically 
an indemnity insurance program similar to traditional fee-for-service plans. As a result non-
active duty beneficiaries were eligible to receive care from civilian providers and to cost share 
the cost of that care with the DOD through the CHAMP US program. 
The CHAMPUS budget for Fiscal Year 1967 was $106 million. Records don't 
indicate how many claims were filed in 1967, but the total probably wasn't more than a few 
thousand. In FY 1994, the CHAMP US budget was more than $3.5 billion, and more than 20 
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million claims were received. Today, nearly 5.7 million people are eligible for 
CHAMPUS/TRICARE benefits. (OCHAMPUS, 1996) 
In the 1980s, the search for ways to improve access to top quality medical care, while 
keeping costs under control, led to several CHAMPUS "demonstration" projects in various 
parts of the U.S. (OCHAMPUS, 1996) The projects included the CHAMPUS Reform 
Initiative (CRI) in California and Hawaii, the Catchment Area Management program in 
Charleston, South Carolina, and the TRICARE Demonstration project in Tidewater, Virginia. 
After evaluating the results of these programs DOD designed TRICARE, a managed care 
program offering beneficiaries alternatives to the fee-for-service program under CHAMPUS. 
C. DOD's MANAGED CARE PROGRAM (TRICARE) 
1. Overview 
TRICARE is the DOD managed care program for members of the uniformed services 
and their families, and survivors and retirees and their families. The TRICARE Program 
brings the direct care and indirect care system together in a cooperative and supportive effort 
to provide access and quality care to military beneficiaries and make optimal use of the limited 
resources available to military medicine. This cooperative effort restructures the MHS S into 
12 Health Service Regions with each region designated a Lead Agent MTF/Commander. 
2. Lead Agent 
The Lead Agent serves as the focal point for health services and coordinates with all 
of the MTFs within their respective region and the Managed Care Support contractor to 
develop an integrated health care delivery plan for their beneficiaries. The regions were 
established to ensure an adequate beneficiary population base to support cost-effective 
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volumes of care under the TRICARE support contracts, and regional access to tertiary care 
provided primarily by medical centers (OASD(HA), 1996). Specific responsibilities ofthe 
Lead Agent include: 
• Develop Regional Health Services Plan 
• Develop contract requirements for region 
• Coordinate patient referrals/Non-availability statements 
• Ensure optimal resource utilization throughout the region (includes Resource 
Sharing) 
• Support contingency plans for continuation of clinical services 
• Approve referral processes within the network 
• Support optimal use ofMTF resources 
• Recommend designation of regional Specialized Treatment Services 
• Develop evaluation plans for managed care goals (Parish, 1995) 
OASD(HA) policy states that the health care system will be monitored by the Military 
Departments and OASD(HA). However, health care is delivered locally; therefore, it must 
be managed locally. MTF Commanders will are given the tools, flexibility and authority to 
make appropriate decisions about the delivery of care. In addition, MTF Commanders and 
Lead Agents are accountable for the health care costs, quality and access in their delivery 
areas for all beneficiaries, in both the civilian networks and the direct care system. 
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3. Triple Option Benefit 
TRICARE provides beneficiaries with three choices for their health care delivery: 
TRICARE Standard, a fee-for-service option previously known as CHAMPUS; TRICARE 
Extra, which offers a preferred provider option (PPO) with discounts; and TRICARE Prime, 
an enrolled health maintenance option (HMO). TRICARE Prime is the Uniform HMO 
Benefit mandated by Section 731 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
1994. This mandate required that the Uniform HMO Benefit option be "to the maximum 
extent possible" incorporated in "all future managed health care initiatives undertaken by 
DOD." The option is required to provide reduced out-of-pocket expenses for the beneficiary 
and a benefit structure that is as uniform throughout the United States. 
The statute further required a determination that, in the particular managed care 
initiative that contains the Uniform HMO Benefit, DOD costs "are not greater than the costs 
that would otherwise be incurred to provide health care to the covered beneficiaries who 
enroll in the option." The TRICARE final rule on establishing and implementing this uniform 
benefit was published in the Federal Register on October 5, 1995. All of the stipulations 
above must now be incorporated in managed care initiatives and the Uniform HMO Benefit 
will replace the benefit currently offered in our various managed care programs. 
4. DOD Modified Capitation Methodology 
The Department of Defense, Health Affairs uses a modified capitation methodology 
that is based upon the MHSS user population as opposed to the traditional capitation model 
which is based on a specific number of enrollees. Through this model OASD(HA) allocates 
resources to the three Services from Defense Health Program funds. 
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The three Services then allocate funds to MTFs based on the eligible beneficiary population. 
Resource allocations are based upon a two-step process that reflects each Service's 
individual requirements yet is consistent with the overall Defense Health Program resource 
allocation framework. The Military Departments allocate resources to each of their MTFs 
based on the modified capitation methodology, designed by the Services to meet their unique 
requirements as approved by Health Affairs. The Military Departments identify all 
CHAMPUS resources for the Lead Agent's management oversight at each of the twelve 
regions. The method for further allocating the CHAMPUS resources will be dependent on 
the Service affiliation of the regional Lead Agent and the existence of a fixed price, at-risk 
managed care support contract. Calculation of the allocation of CHAMP US resources to 
MTFs in regions with such contracts is made by Health Affairs and provided to the Military 
Departments. (OASD(HA), 1996) 
In regiOns with TRICARE managed support contracts, the MTF's 
TRICARE/CHAMPUS allocation will be retained by the parent Services and pooled among 
the Services to fund Lead Agent's execution of the support contract. Health Affairs will 
calculate both catchment area and out of catchment area TRICARE/CHAMPUS allocations 
and provide them to the Military Departments. 
Under this methodology, each Service remains accountable for the TRICARE managed care 
support contract. (OASD (HA), 1996) 
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5. Managed Care Support Contracts 
A major component ofTRICARE is the Managed Care Support Contracts (MCSC) 
that supplement the capabilities of the regional MTF health care delivery networks. These 
contracts are procured centrally by the TRICARE Support Office and will assist the Lead 
Agents and MTFs in meeting their responsibilities to improve access to quality health care, 
while containing costs. Seven fixed-price, at-risk contracts will be awarded in support of the 
twelve Health Service Regions. The contracts for Regions 3, 4, 6,7,8, 9, 10, 11, 12 have been 
awarded and the estimated award dates for Region 1 is August 1997, Region 2 September 
1997, Region 5 September 1997. The primary functions ofthe support contracts according 
to OASD(HA) are: 
• Development of civilian provider networks in support ofboth the TRICARE Prime 
and TRICARE Extra benefits 
• Claims processing and data collection 
• Utilization management and quality assurance 
• Patient routing and referral, and beneficiary services 
• TRICARE Prime program enrollment 
• Provider and beneficiary education 
• Marketing 
• Resource Sharing/Resource Support 
The key concept associated with the managed care support contracts is that the 
Services and hence the Federal government will share in the financial risk for the TRICARE 
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program. In a truly capitated environment the contractor would receive a specified dollar 
amount for each enrolled member. However, in the 1\1HSS case there is an existing direct 
health care system that is going to be augmented by the managed care support contractor. 
As a result of the unique military environment it is not possible to set a fixed capitated rate 
for the health care portion of the MCSC. A variety of factors preclude this, such as, the 
changing beneficiary population due to permanent change of station (PCS) orders, reduction 
in force and BRAC initiatives, and lastly the vast size of the DOD health care system which 
makes it impossible to change the entire CHAMPUS system from a basic fee-for-service 
indemnity plan to an HMO all at once for all beneficiaries. As a result, in the MCSC the 
administrative portion of the contract and the profit thereon is fixed, while the health care 
costs are subject to adjustments via a bid price adjustment process. The profit on health care 
is fixed, however, it may be reduced or lost through the risk sharing provisions. The resulting 
gains or losses incurred by the contractor are then shared with the government based on the 
risk sharing provisions in the contract. The bid price adjustment process and risk sharing 
provisions will be discussed in Chapter III. 
The managed care support contracts (MCSC) provide substantial incentives for the 
contractor to partner with the MTF in keeping health care costs down. One method of 
partnership is through the use ofResource Sharing Agreements (RSA). Chapter III discusses 
this concept ofResource Sharing. 
6. Future Changes in Financing TRICARE 
A new revised financing method for allocating funds is being explored and may be 
implemented in future managed care support contracts for Region 1 and possibly Regions 2 
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and 5. Under this approach, the MTF will receive TRICARE funds in advance for those 
TRICARE eligibles who enroll in Prime with an MTF Primary Care Manager (PCM), and the 
MTF will have sole financial responsibility and risk for these TRICARE eligibles (i.e., the 
MCS contractor will not be at risk for the MTF Prime enrollees). For any civilian care 
required for the MTF Prime enrollees, the MTF will pay the contractor at the individual 
network provider rates (i.e., discounted). The contractor will track those claims paid for the 
MTF' s Prime enrollees separately from other TRICARE claims, and the MTF will reimburse 
the contractor on a monthly basis after receiving a report from the contractor documenting 
the claims paid for MTF Prime enrollees. The contractor will continue to be at risk for all 
other CHAMPUS eligibles (those who enroll in Prime with civilian PCMs and all beneficiaries 
in Extra and Standard), with bid price adjustments and risk sharing provisions applicable only 
to these non-MTF Prime enrollees. (OASD (HA), 1996) The bid price adjustment and risk 
sharing provisions will be discussed in Chapter III. 
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ill. OVERVIEW OF BID PRICE AND RESOURCE SHARING AGREEMENTS 
A. GENERAL 
Resource Sharing Agreements (RSAs) are a feature in the MCSC which allow the 
contractor, through agreements with MTF Commanders, to provide personnel, equipment, 
and supplies to MTFs for the purpose of enhancing the MTF' s capability of providing needed 
inpatient and outpatient care to beneficiaries (Montgomery, 1994). There are two types of 
RSAs, internal and external. These two types of agreements fall into one of three categories: 
a new service that recaptures CHA1\1PUS workload, replacement of an existing MTF service 
whose workload was counted in the data collection period (DCP) or new workload that was 
not counted in the DCP (cost avoidance), and a Partnership conversion that existed in the 
DCP. 
The contractor's original bid price is based on information supplied by the government 
that includes CHAMPUS Costs, CHA1\1PUS and MTF utilization (without resource sharing), 
CHA1\1PUS inflation/deflation, and numbers of eligible beneficiaries during the twelve months 
prior to the start of health care delivery under the contract. This period is referred to as the 
"data collection period" (DCP) or the "base period". 
Internal Resource Sharing is designed to enhance the MTF capability to treat patients 
through the augmentation of staff, equipment, or supplies by the managed care support 
contractor, thereby recapturing TRICARE patients and realizing savings for the government 
(Brock, 1996). 
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External Resource Sharing involves MTF physicians or other health care professionals 
providing care to CHAMPUS eligibles in a civilian health care facility. In this type of 
agreement the contractor avoids paying the professional's fee and only pays for the facility 
charges under CHAMPUS. The avoidance of professional charges should create a gain to 
be shared by the government and the contractor. In the chapter we will discuss the key 
elements of the MCSC that are affected by the use ofRSAs and the process involved with 
establishing an RSA. 
B. KEY ELEMENTS AFFECTED BY RESOURCE SHARING AGREEMENTS 
1. Bid Price/Bid Price Adjustment 
The contractor's bid price is composed of three elements: fixed administrative costs, 
fixed profit on administrative costs and health care costs, and expected health care costs. The 
expected health care costs to be incurred by the MCS contractor are composed of eight 
categories; three inpatient, four outpatient, and a category for other costs: 
• Category 1 Inpatient Medical/Surgery 
• Category 2 Inpatient OB/GYN 
• Category 3 Inpatient Psychiatry 
• Category 4 Outpatient Medical/Surgery 
• Category 5 Outpatient Psychiatry 
• Category 6 Outpatient Lab/X-ray 
• Category 7 Outpatient Other (includes Pharmacy) 
• Category 8 Resource Sharing, DRG Capital and Medical Education 
22 
The health care costs for categories 1-7 are used in the bid price formula and are broken 
down by active duty dependent (ADD) and non-active duty dependent (NADD) and the type 
of plan (i.e., prime, extra, standard) for each option period. Category 8 expenditures are 
added to the bid price for the entire Region. 
As mentioned earlier the contractor's original bid price is based on information 
supplied by the government. Government provided information consists of CHAMPUS 
Costs, CHAMPUS and MTF utilization (without resource sharing), CHAMPUS 
inflation/deflation, and numbers of eligible beneficiaries during the twelve months prior to the 
start of health care delivery under the contract. The government also supplies the contractor 
with estimates of key components of the DCP information and projections of CHAMPUS 
inflation rates for each ofthe five one year option periods for health care delivery. 
In developing their price proposals, the bidders are required by the government to 
project changes in CHAMPUS costs for each option period based on their own assumptions 
of how well they can market their program and manage the health care of the beneficiary 
population. 
The expected health care costs are the portion of the contract that is subject to bid 
price adjustment. Four factors influence the bid price adjustment: 
• changes from the data collection period (DCP) 
• changes in ADD and NADD CHAMPUS eligible beneficiaries 
• changes in MTF utilization levels and inpatient case mix 
• changes in inflation, and risk sharing 
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The administrative cost and profit thereon are not subject to bid price adjustment. 
The bid price adjustment process proceeds through a series of events that begin with 
the bidder being awarded the contract based on his best and final offer (BAFO) using the DCP 
information. The first two adjustments use revised DCP data which establishes a baseline 
from which the health care services cost are measured. The first adjustment occurs seven 
months into the first option year of health care delivery when better DCP estimates are 
available. Adjustments are made due to changes in estimates of MTF utilization, 
inflation/deflation factors, and beneficiary population. Seven months into option period 2 and 
1 9 months after health care delivery begins, a final estimate of the DCP data is used for an 
adjustment of the health care costs for each of the five option years. 
Subsequent to this, two adjustments take place for each option period where the cost 
from the adjustment are compared to the contractor's actual costs. The resulting gain or loss 
may be shared between the contractor and the government according to the risk sharing 
provisions of the contract. Table 1 on page 25 provides a schedule ofBid Price Adjustments 
as required by the contract. 
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Time of Adjustment Adjustments Made 
7th Month of Option Period 1 Initial DCP Changes 
7th Month of Option Period 2 Final DCP Changes 
Initial Option Period 1 Changes 
7th Month of Option Period 3 Final Option Period 1 Changes 
Initial Option Period 2 Changes 
7th Month of Option Period 4 Final Option Period 2 Changes 
Initial Option Period 3 Changes 
7th Month of Option Period 5 Final Option Period 3 Changes 
Initial Option Period 4 Changes 
7th Month after Option Period 5 Final Option Period 4 Changes 
Initial Option Period 5 Changes 
13th Month after Option Period 5 Final Option Period 5 Changes 
Table 1. Schedule ofBid Price Adjustments 
a. Components of Bid Price Associated with RSAs 
In addition to the above, the bid prices for each of the contract option periods 
are directly influenced by a series of ratios bid by the contractor. Two of these are of critical 
importance in relationship to resource sharing: the "0" factor for changes in MTF utilization, 
and the "resource sharing trend factor" (Montgomery, 1994). 
(1) "0" Factor for MTF Utilization. The "0" factor addresses 
adjustments in MTF utilization and is calculated for both inpatient costs, Category 1-3, and 
outpatient costs, Category 4-7. The "0" factor is set at 1. 00 if there are no changes in MTF 
utilization from the DCP. For a specific option period if the value is greater than 1.00, then 
25 
MTF utilization is expected to decrease. This means relatively more care is going to be 
provided by the contractor thereby increasing the health care costs for the contractor which 
the government must pay. If the value is less than 1.00, then MTF utilization is expected to 
increase. In this situation the MTF is recapturing workload that was previously done by the 
contractor thereby decreasing the contractor's cost. 
The "0" factor for inpatient care is based on the ratio of nonavailability 
statements (NASs) per eligible issued by MTFs in the option period, compared with the ratio 
for the DCP data. For outpatient care it is based on changes in the ratio of outpatient visits 
per eligible non active duty personnel, compared with the ratio for the DCP data and the 
volume trade off factor (VTF). 
The volume trade off factor (VTF) reflects that changes in outpatient 
MTF utilization do not always result in equal and opposite changes in CHAMPUS utilization. 
This is due in part to a variety of factors such as: MTF care is free and there are cost shares 
associated with TRICARE, individuals may have private health insurance, or individuals may 
decide not to be treated. So the VTF assumes that demand for outpatient health care in the 
MTF is greater than demand for care under TRICARE. For example, a volume trade off 
factor of2.0 implies that 2.0 unit increase in MTF workload constitutes a 1.0 unit decrease 
in TRICARE/CHAMPUS workload. Volume trade off factors are bid separately for both 
active duty dependent (ADD) and non active duty dependent (NADD) since they may be 
different. The "0" factor for inpatient care is calculated as follows: 
0 = (No/Nb) x N% +nooN% where, 
No =ratio of NASs per eligible in option period 
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Nb = ratio ofNASs per eligible in base period 
N% =proportion ofCHAMPUS costs requiring an NAS (i.e., 55%) 
nonN% =proportion ofCHAMPUS costs not requiring an NAS (i.e., 45%) 
As mentioned above the Bid Price Adjustment is directly influenced by changes in MTF 
utilization which is represented by the "0" factor in the bid price formula. The following is 
an example of how the inpatient "0" factor is calculated. Assume the ratio ofNASs per 
eligible in the DCP is .100, and the ratio is projected to be .102 for the first option period. 
If the DCP data indicates that 60% of inpatient TRICARE/CHAMPUS costs require an NAS 
(N%), the resulting inpatient "0" factor for the first option period (Op), is computed as 
follows: 
Op =(.102/.100) x .60) +.40 = 1.012 projected "0" factor 
If, after the option period (19th month BPA), the final ratio ofNASs per eligible issued in the 
DCP is . 098 instead of .1 02 which had been initially projected, the resulting actual "0" factor 
for the region in the first option period (Oa) is: 
Oa = (.098/.100) x .60) + .40 = .988 actual "0" factor 
Thus, the ratio ofthe actual "0" factor (Oa) to the projected "0" factor (Op) used in the bid 
price adjustment formula for that option period is: 
(Oa/Op) = (.988/1.012) = .976 
If all other factors in the bid price formula do not change, this ratio results in all inpatient 
costs being adjusted downward by a factor of .024 or 2.4%. (Montgomery, 1994) 
The outpatient "0" factor is calculated using the formula: 
0 = [Cb + (Mb- Mo)NTF]/Cb where, 
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Cb = the ratio of CHAN£PUS outpatient visits per CHAN£PUS eligible beneficiary 
in the DCP 
Mb = the ratio of non active duty MTF outpatient visits per CHAN£PUS eligible 
beneficiary during the DCP 
Mo = the ratio of non active duty MTF outpatient visits per CHAMPUS eligible 
beneficiary during the option period 
VTF = the volume trade off factor for outpatient care 
For example, in the DCP (the base period) the ratio ofNADD MTF CHAMPUS outpatient 
visits per CHAMPUS eligible is 2.00 (Cb) and the ratio ofNADD MTF outpatient visits per 
CHAMPUS eligible is 4.00 (Mb). Also assume the ratio ofNADD MTF outpatient visits per 
CHAN£PUS eligible during an option period (Mo) is initially projected to be 3.80 in the 
seventh month following the end of the option period and further assume that the volume 
trade off factor is 1.8. The projected "0" factor (Op) is calculated as follows: 
Op = [2.0 + (4.00- 3.80)/1.8]/2.0 = 1.06 projected "0" factor 
This ratio indicates that, all other factors being equal, all outpatient cost projections for the 
option period (for the NADD category of beneficiary) would be increased by ten percent 
when compared with the costs applicable to the DCP or "base period". 
If, 19 months after the option period, the actual ratio of outpatient 
visits per CHAMPUS eligible provided by the MTF to non active duty beneficiaries was 3.60, 
instead of the projected 3.80, the actual "0" factor (Oa) for the option period is completed 
as follows: 
Oa = [2.00 + (4.00- 3.60)11.8]/2.00 = 1.11 actual "0" factor 
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Therefore, all projected outpatient costs would be multiplied, in the bid price adjustment 
formula, by the ratio: 
Oa/Op = 1.11/1.06 = 1.048 
If all other factors in the bid price formula do not change, this ratio results in a 4. 8% increase 
in outpatient costs in the bid price adjustment. 
b. Impact of Workload 
The above are examples of calculating the "0" factor without taking into 
consideration workload attributable to resource sharing. The contractor may be given full 
"workload credit" for RSA.s or a percentage less than 100%. The workload in question takes 
place in the MTF. The "credit" to the contractor is actually an offset to MTF workload to 
ensure there are no dis-incentives for the contractor to do resource sharing. If the contractor 
is given full "workload credit" for the RSA this workload is counted just as if the patients 
being seen in the MTF under the agreement were being seen in the civilian network. Since 
the contractor has already reflected savings to the government in the reduced bid price, it is 
appropriate to give the contractor full credit for workload under resource sharing until the 
point where the contractor has spent the amount set forth in the bid for Category 8 resource 
sharing. Once the contractor has spent this amount on resource sharing, the projected savings 
used to determine the bid price are assumed to be realized. Beyond this point "workload 
credit" should be negotiated by the MTF and contractor for each subsequent RSA. 
(1) Workload Reporting. In order for resource sharing to be cost-
effective for both parties it is imperative that the contractor and MTF personnel have a 
common basis for determining the full impact of resource sharing on MTF workload. 
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Workload refers to inpatient admissions or outpatient visits as recorded by the MTF. Specific 
guidelines to workload reporting can be found in Appendix A. The key concept behind 
workload reporting is determining the number of admissions and outpatient visits, reported 
by the MTF under the Medical Expense and Reporting System (MEPRS), which would not 
exist without resource sharing. 
For example, if the RSA is for a Podiatrist, workload will be reported 
as an outpatient visit. If the RSA were for a support service such as a lab technician then the 
workload may be some percentage of the total lab tests performed, again specific guidelines 
are in Appendix A. 
The second step in the resource sharing process concerning workload 
is determining the amount of"workload credit" that is going to be given to the contractor for 
the resource sharing agreement. Once the workload counting method is established, the MTF 
and the contractor must agree on the amount of "workload credit" that the contractor will 
recieve. The workload credit offsets the actual workload that will be done in the MTF. This 
ensures that there is not a dis-incentive for the contractor to perform RS. If a workload credit 
were not given to the contractor, then bid price adjustment would include the workload in the 
MTF' s utilization as an increase. Denying the contractor the workload credit causes a 
decrease in the "0" factor resulting in a decreased payment to the contractor. The 
contractor would then incur two costs associated with doing RS: first, the cost of the RSA 
itself, and secondly, the decreased payment associated with the decreased "0" factor in the 
BP A. Therefore, the workload credit was established to provide incentive to the contractor 
to perform RSAs by offsetting the effect ofRSAs on the "0" factor. 
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As mentioned in the previous section it is appropriate to give the 
contractor full workload credit (100%) up to the point where the contractor has spent the 
entire amount stated in the bid for Category 8, resource sharing expenditures. While this is 
the appropriate credit to give in these circumstances, the workload credit can be negotiated 
at any time if the MTF does not agree that the RSA is cost-effective to the government if the 
contractor receives full "workload credit". 
(2) Resource Sharing Trend Factor. As one of eight separate trend 
factors developed by the contractor the resource sharing trend factor is based on a savings 
to cost ratio estimated by the contractor for the amount of money to be spent on resource 
sharing. Through the use of this trend factor (less than 1.00) the contractor's original bid 
price is reduced by the net savings expected from using resource sharing. 
For example, if the contractor estimates that for each dollar spent on 
resource sharing under the contract, CHAMPUS costs will be reduced by $2.1 0, this would 
be reflected in a savings to cost ratio of 2.1. If the contractor plans to spend $10 million on 
Category 8 costs for resource sharing then the expected gross CHAMPUS savings would be 
$21 million. As a result the contractor's bid price would be reduced by $11 million, the net 
savings, that is the gross amount saved, $21 million, minus the amount spent on resource 
sharing, $10 million. 
However, the resource sharing trend factor is developed based on the 
savings-to-cost ratio for resource sharing expenditures. In the above example, if the 
estimated CHAMPUS costs without resource sharing were expected to be $55 million, with 
gross savings of $21 million and resource sharing costs of $10 million, then the contractor 
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would have to bid a resource sharing trend factor of[($55m- $21m)/$55m = .62] .62 in order 
to produce a gross savings of$21 million. The net savings of$11 million ($21m- $10m) 
is reflected in the reduced bid price prior to the savings being realized. 
For a better conceptual idea of how the resource sharing trend factor 
reduces the bid price up front, an aggregate trend factor was used in this example. In the 
contract there are 210 individual resource sharing trend factors for all seven health care cost 
categories by ADD and NADD for the prime, extra, and standard programs for each option 
period. It is also important to note that in the actual bid price formula the resource sharing 
trend factor is one of eight trend factors whose total product is used for each plan for a 
particular cost category for each option period (see Table 2). For example, in Table 2, for 
Extra the total index of .988 is the product of the eight trend factors (i.e., 1.04 x 1.01 x .98 
x .99, ... etc.). 
Trend Factors Prime Extra Standard 
Inflation 1.04 1.04 1.04 
Cost Sharing 1.03 1.01 1.00 
Provider Discounts .98 .98 1.00 
COB/TPL .99 .99 .99 
Utilization Rates 1.05 1.02 1.02 
Utilization Mgt. .94 .97 .99 
Resource Sharing .96 .98 .98 
Intensity & Other 1.00 1.00 1.02 
TOTAL INDEX .985 .988 1.039 
Table 2. Trend Factors for One Cost Category in a Specific Option Period 
32 
As mentioned above the "0" factor and resource sharing trend factor 
act as multipliers of the projected health care costs. If these multipliers are less than one they 
cause the bid price to go down, if they are greater than one they cause the bid price to go up. 
The "0" factor is used to account for changes in MTF utilization for each option period as 
a result of changes in MTF utilization per CHAMPUS eligible beneficiary. These changes are 
measured against the final DCP projections and the "0" factor is an aggregate measure of 
MTF utilization for the entire region, rather than for an individual MTF. 
2. Risk Sharing Feature 
The risk sharing requirement provides a methodology in which the government and 
contractor may share in both the cost underruns and overruns. Cost overruns occur when the 
Actual Health Care Services Cost (AHCSC) exceeds the Adjusted Proposed Health Care 
Services Price (APHCSP), which includes profit on health care services. In tum cost 
underruns occur when the AHCSC are less than the Adjusted Proposed Health Care Cost 
(APHCSC), which does not include the contractor's profit. The determination of gains or 
losses and the risk sharing process occurs at the time of bid price adjustment. A preliminary 
risk sharing adjustment to the contract price for an option period is calculated at the seventh 
month following the end of that option period and a final risk sharing adjustment is made at 
the nineteenth month following the end of that option period. 
a. Loss Sharing 
Before the government begins to share in any of the cost overruns, the 
contractor must first lose all health care services profit plus one percent ofthe APHCSP. 
Therefore, ifthe AHCSC is between 100% ofthe APHCSC and 101% ofthe APHCSP then 
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governments share of the loss is zero. If the AHCSC is greater than 101% of the APHCSP 
the government's share is 80% up to the Point ofTotal Government Responsibility (POTGR). 
The POTGR is the point at which the contractor has absorbed losses equaling the cumulative 
profit on health care realized for all option periods completed, including any gains realized 
through gain sharing, plus an additional amount of contractor equity. As a part of the 
contract, the government requires the contractor to place a specific amount of corporate 
equity at risk (i.e., $10 million per option period). This amount must meet or exceed 
government requirements. At the POTGR the government absorbs 100% of all remaining 
losses. 
The following is a modified version of an example of the loss sharing scenario 
taken from Captain Montgomery's paper on Resource Sharing Opportunities dated December 
1994. Suppose in a given option period, the APHCSC is $400,000,000 and the fixed health 
care profit is $20,000,000. This would make the APHCSP equal $420,000,000. Now, 
assume the actual health care cost (AHCSC) experienced by the contractor in the option 
period is $450,000,000, that the equity limit for the option period is $10,000,000, and that 
there are no prior profits or gains to be considered. The cost overruns or loss for the option 
period is $50,000,000 ($450 m -$ 400 m). 
The government's share in the losses would be as follows: 
101% ofthe APHCSP = 101% x $420,000,000 = $424,200,000 
AHCSC were $450,000,000, so the government's share of the loss is 
($450,000,000- $424,200,000) X 80% = $20,640 
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The contractor's loss would be as follows: 
Profit plus 1% of bid price 
($20,000,000 + (.01 x $420,000,000) = $24,200,000, plus 
20% of losses not covered by the government 
(.20 x ($450,000,000- $424,200,000) = $5,160,000 for 
a total loss of$29,360,000 
In this example the amount of equity lost by the contractor is 1% of the APHCSP (.01 x 
$420,000,000 = $4,200,000) plus the 20% loss share of$5,160,000. This total of$9,360,000 
falls short of the bid equity of$10,000,000 for the option period, therefore the POTGR does 
not come into effect and the government does not pay 100%. 
b. Gain Sharing 
Gain sharing adjustments occur when the AHCSC is less than the APHCSC, 
a cost underrun. The amount shared between the government and contractor is dependent on 
the size of the gain relative to the APHCSC. This is known as the "gain sharing corridor". 
If the AHCSC is between 100% and 80% of the APHCSC then the government shares in 80% 
of the gain and the contractor 20%. Ifthe AHCSC is less than 80% of APHCSC then the 
gain sharing consists of two calculations. First, the government receives 80% of 20% x 
APHCSC. Then, the government receives 90% of the remaining gain. The contractor 
receives 20% of20% x APHCSC and 10% ofthe remaining gain. 
The following is a modified version of an example of the gain sharing scenario 
taken from Captain Montgomery's paper on Resource Sharing Opportunities dated December 
1994. Suppose that, in a particular option period, the APHCSC is $400,000,000, and the 
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AHCSC is only $300,000,000. Since the AHCSC are 75% of the APHCSC 
($300,000,000/$400,000,000 = .75), this would place the AHCSC in the less than 80% 
category triggering two gain share computations. The total gain amount to be shared is 
$100,000,000, the first 20% ofthe APHCSC or $80,000 falls into the government's 80% gain 
sharing category and the remaining 5% of the APHCSC or $20,000 falls into the 90% gain 
sharing category. Thus the government would be allocated (80% of $80,000,000) 
$64,000,000 and (90% of$20,000,000) $18,000,000, for a total gain of$82,000,000. The 
contractor would be allowed to keep the remainder of the savings, which in this case would 
be $18,000,000. 
Completing the gain sharing through a variance analysis, as shown below, 
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c. Risk Sharing and RSAs 
Each RSA has the potential for contributing to either increasing the gains or 
lowering the losses in the final adjusted contract bid price. RSAs will be cost-effective in 
either case. RSAs should not be implemented ifthe FAW does not indicate they will be cost-
effective. When evaluating RSAs through the Financial Analysis Worksheet specific estimates 
will be generated which will reflect the anticipated gains or losses associated with a particular 
RSA. While estimates are completed for each individual RSA concerning potential gains or 
losses, the actual gains or losses are calculated on a cumulative basis for an entire Health 
Services Region. So while one RSA at a particular MTF may be contributing toward a 
potential gain the region could still incur a loss in the final BP A The gain/loss sharing 
provisions using RSAs are the same as those described above. 
C. RESOURCE SHARING AGREEMENT PROCESS 
1. Identification and Evaluation of Potential RSAs 
The identification and evaluation ofRSAs involves three major participants: the MTF, 
the Contractor, and the Lead Agent. Through their combined efforts Resource Sharing 
opportunities can be identified that will recapture CHAMPUS workload and optimize the use 
ofMTF resources. Before designating a potential Resource Sharing (RS) application other 
alternatives should be considered. This is a basic "make or buy" evaluation. This concept is 
also known as "sourcing" decisions in the business world. For example, rather than own and 
maintain its computer systems, Kodak outsourced its entire computer operation to IBM. 
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If the decision is to "make", the :MHSS must arrange for additional military or civil 
service manning to perform the work. If it is to "buy", additional services must be purchased 
through contracting, resource support, or resource sharing. In today' s environment of 
declining DOD budgets and manpower, establishing new military and civil service billets is 
very unlikely. If the decision is to buy the use of personal service contracts or resource 
support will involve using existing MTF operating funds, which are already very limited. As 
a result, resource sharing provides an attractive alternative for "buy" decisions. 
In general, if the MTF has operating funds available, one of the other methods should 
be explored before utilizing RS. All MTFs face resource constraints such as Operation and 
Maintenance funding, personnel ceilings, long procurement lead times, and temporary 
deployments. As a result it is difficult for the MTF to achieve the "right mix" of resources 
(OASD(HA), Undated). Therefore, most MTFs have some "available" capacity such as clinic 
space, unstaffed beds, idle Operating Room time, or under-utilized personnel skills. RS 
enables MTFs to optimize their "available" capacity and recapture CHAl\1PUS care at a lower 
overall cost to the government (OASD(HA), undated). Once RS is identified as the best 
course of action, the cost effectiveness of the agreement must then be evaluated through the 
Financial Analysis Worksheet, a personal computer based spreadsheet developed by Kennell 
and Associates for OASD(HA). 
a. Contractor's Role 
The contractor has built in incentives to perform Resource Sharing since the 
bid price was decreased to reflect assumed savings through using RSAs. If these front loaded 
savings are not realized, serious losses might be incurred. As a publicly traded corporation 
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the contractor is in business to earn a satisfactory rate of return for shareholders. Hence the 
contractor is under serious pressure to increase profits. 
In developing estimated savings from using RSAs, the contractor identified 
potential areas in their bid proposal where RSAs may be beneficial. In addition, the 
contractor is required to submit an annual Resource Sharing plan that is developed in 
conjunction with the MTFs and Lead Agent. The plan identifies advantageous RS 
opportunities. The contractor must also provide a detailed cost analysis for each RS proposal 
that includes the actual cost of providing the personnel, equipment and/or supplies, the 
anticipated increase in services provided within the MTF, the effect of the agreement on the 
bid price adjustment, the anticipated support required from the MTF and the net savings to 
the government and the contractor. The contractor is provided with a copy of the 
government's Financial Analysis Worksheet (FA W) to assist with this cost analysis. The 
contractor may also use other forms of analysis to evaluate potential RSAs but the officially 
recognized format is the FA W. 
b. MTF's andLeadAgent's Roles 
The MTF may not have direct incentives to use RSAs as those of the 
contractor, because the savings associated with using RSAs currently goes to the government 
as a whole and the individual MTF probably will not receive any of the savings. However, 
the MTF is generally expected to fund the marginal expenses associated with the RSA out of 
its current operating budget. Since the government has already benefited from the savings 
associated through the reduced bid price, there is an implied contract between the government 
and the contractor to utilize RSAs when they are cost-effective. In addition, while RSAs may 
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not bring direct dollar savings, RSAs may assist the MTF commander's objective of 
maximizing the use of the MTF' s current personnel and facilities resources. 
The MTF and Lead Agent should team with the contractor in developing the 
contractor's RS plan. The MTF and Lead Agent should also monitor CHAJ\.1PUS 
expenditures and referral patterns for high cost and/or high volume procedures that may be 
candidates for RS. The MTFs are required to perform an annual environmental assessment 
for the Lead Agent to assist in the development of a regional business plan. The information 
collected during this assessment may be used in identifYing potential areas where RSAs may 
be used. The MTF is required to use the FA W in evaluating potential RSAs. This provides 
the MTF and Lead Agent with a benchmark for comparison with the contractor's workload 
and cost analysis. All RSAs must be approved by the MTF commander and Lead Agent. 
(I) Submission ofRSAProposal. Once an opportunity for a potential 
RSA is identified the MTF submits a proposal in a format designated by the contractor. The 
information the contractor needs to perform their analysis includes: 
• the number and type of personnel required 
• anticipated workload by active duty dependents (ADD) and non-active duty 
dependents (NADD) beneficiary categories 
• the marginal costs (i.e., pharmacy, supply) associated with each visit/admission 
This information is forwarded to the contractor where the proposal will undergo analysis for 
cost effectiveness. The contractor is free to gather information from any sources deemed 
useful for the analysis. The MTFs should also be doing their own analysis using the FAW. 
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2. Evaluating RSA for Cost Effectiveness 
a. Contractor's Cost Benefit Analysis 
Once the contractor receives a RS request a two step analysis is completed. 
The first step is to determine the overall appropriateness of the proposal. Does the number 
of personnel requested match the estimated workload? What is the probability of :finding this 
number and type of providers in the given area? The contractor's analyst will rely on 
experience in the civilian market and upon prior government experience in answering these 
questions. The analyst will prepare a cost/benefit analysis comparing estimated costs avoided 
(in standard, extra, and prime categories by ADD and NADD) to the proposed costs ofRS, 
including marginal costs. This process relies upon government provided computer tapes of 
data to determine historical CHAMPUS costs over a given period of time and estimated 
ancillary services generated per visit.(Smith, 1995) 
As required by the government the contractor will then use the FA W to 
determine the agreement's impact on three areas: "hidden dollars" - "0" factor in bid price 
adjustment; "real dollars"- what is actually paid to providers versus historical CHAMPUS 
expenditures; "really real dollars" - marginal costs that impact on the MTF' s direct budget 
(Smith, 1995). Details on the content and completion ofthe FAW are presented in the next 
section. 
b. Completing the Financial Analysis Worksheet 
The OASD(HA)'s contractor, Kennell and Associates, developed a tool to 
assist Lead Agents, MTFs, and contractors in evaluating proposed RSAs for cost-
effectiveness. The section contains excerpts and summaries of the User's Guide for Resource 
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Sharing Financial Analysis Worksheets written by Kennell and Associates dated October 6, 
1995 and the DOD Health Services Region 3 Resource Sharing Manual (undated). 
The worksheet is designed to answer two questions for each proposed RSA: 
• Is the proposed agreement projected to be cost-effective? 
• Is the proposed contractor workload credit appropriate? 
An agreement is determined to be cost-effective if the sum of the MTF 
marginal expenses and the contractor's expenses for the proposed agreement is less than the 
Government's share of the projected CHAMP US savings. This is based on the assumption 
that the government will be gain sharing with the contractor in the BP A. 
The second question concerns the appropriateness of workload credit. First, 
the contractor credit cannot exceed the credit counted under the Guidelines for Resource 
Sharing Workload Reporting outlined in Appendix A. Second, a profit rate limit may or may 
not apply dependent on whether the RSAs' savings are already reflected in the initial bid 
price. For agreements whose savings are included in the bid price, the profit rate on RSAs 
may exceed the overall contract's health care profit rate (i.e., 5%). For agreements whose 
savings exceed those assumed in the bid price, the profit rate may not exceed the overall 
health care profit rate. It is the responsibility of the Lead Agent to monitor contractor 
expenditures on RSAs within their region and notify the MTFs when overall contractor RS 
expenditures have exceeded those proposed in the up front bid price. The contractor's 
projected gains for future agreements once the up-front bid price expenditures are exceeded 
are subject to profit rate limitations. The "case" page of the FA W makes the determination 
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of whether the proposed RS expenditures are already included in the contractor's aggregate 
Best and Final Offer (BAFO) spending assumption. (See Appendix B) 
To summarize and recap information presented in earlier chapters and present 
it in context with the worksheet, internal RS savings can accrue to the government in three 
ways: 
• For those resource sharing investments assumed as part of the contractor's 
proposal, the contractor's bid price includes a cost-per-eligible (resource sharing) 
trend factor for resource sharing savings. This creates a lower up-front bid price. 
These savings are calculated in Section I of the worksheet in Appendix B. 
• If partial workload credit is negotiated, the government will realize savings in the 
Bid Price Adjustment for MTF utilization (the "0" factor). This can result in a 
more favorable bid price adjustment for the government. These savings are 
calculated in Section II of the worksheet in Appendix B. 
• In accordance with the risk sharing provisions of the contract the government will 
also realize 80 or 90 percent of any gains associated with RS as a result of a 
favorable bid price adjustment for the entire region. The actual percentage 
depends on the amount of the gain. These savings are calculated in Section IV of 
the worksheet in Appendix B. 
Under external RS the government has not received up front savings from the contractor's 
BAFO proposal, since the BAFO does not include external RS. Instead RS savings accrue 
in two ways: 
• Partial contractor workload credit which results in "0" factor savings in the BP A 
• Same risk sharing provisions outlined under internal RS 
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In accordance with the contract, MTF commanders or their designated 
representatives are required to complete the FA W in negotiating each proposed RSA, in 
addition to any other analyses prepared by the contractor or the MTF. The worksheet itself 
can be broken down into three parts, the first being a series of inputs required to calculate the 
cost-effectiveness ofthe agreement, the second being the BAFO data page, and the third 
being the five section output from using the inputs, the BAFO data, and the case page. (See 
Appendix B) 
( 1) Inputs to Financial Analysis Worksheet. 
• Option Period: The option period covered by the proposed agreement. A new 
worksheet must be completed each year since the cost-effectiveness of an 
agreement may change. 
• Contractor Expenditures: The expected contractor expenditures for Category 8, 
resource sharing, costs for CHAMPUS and non-CHAMPUS eligibles for this 
specific RSA; the expected Category 8 costs for non-CHAMPUS eligibles only; 
and the expected costs for CHAMPUS eligible only. The expected costs can be 
estimated by using the prior year cost of a partnership agreement (if there is no 
anticipated change in workload), the number of workload units expected to be 
produced multiplied by the expected provider fee for service, or by the total 
resource sharing capitated salary of all expected providers and professional staff 
• MTF Marginal Expenditures: The projected MTF marginal expenditures for both 
CHAMPUS and non-CHAMPUS eligibles. The MTF marginal expenditures for 
CHAMPUS eligibles only. Currently the best source for determining the marginal 
expenditures associated with a particular agreement is the Medical Expense and 
Performance Reporting System. MEPRS allows MTFs to step down the ancillary 
and supply costs associated with specific cost centers. 
• Workload Credit: The contractor RS workload credit assumed in the analysis. It 
is appropriate to give the contractor 100% workload credit up to the point where 
the contractor exceeds the proposed RS expenditures in the initial bid price. 
However, if an agreement does not come out favorable using the contractor 100% 
credit, the credit may be negotiated to a lower percentage. 
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• MTF AdmissionsNisits Enabled by Resource Sharing: The number of MTF 
admissions and outpatient visits enabled by the RSA by ADD and NADD for 
CHAMPUS and non-CHAMPUS eligibles. This count may include admissions 
and visits indirectly associated with the RSA (i.e., RSA for anesthesiologist or 
nursing staff); The number ofMTF admissions and outpatient visits broken down 
by CHAMPUS and non-CHAMPUS eligibles only. 
• Expected Risk Sharing Responsibility: It is assumed that the contractor will 
efficiently and effectively carry out the agreement and lower overall CHAMPUS 
expenditures. Therefore, Kennell and Associates recommends use of the 80% gain 
sharing category. As a result the government will share in 80% of any gains 
associated with the agreement and the contractor will keep 20%. 
• Estimated Volume Trade-OffFactor: The volume trade-off factor specific to this 
RSA for admissions or outpatient visits. It is anticipated to be lower than the VTF 
for MTF care overall provided in the RFP. This factor is used to estimate 
CHAMPUS avoidance savings. This is a key factor when evaluating a potential 
RSA so the assumptions made concerning the VTF should be monitored closely 
if the agreement is implemented. There is no standard method for estimating the 
VTF prior to establishing the RSA but the MTF can monitor the change in 
CHAMP US costs once the agreement is in place. If the VTF is higher than 
expected the agreement may not be cost-effective (i.e., every 3 MTF visits 
corresponds to a reduction in 1 CHAMPUS visit instead of every 2 MTF visits 
corresponding to a reduction in 1 CHAMPUS visit). 
• Estimated CHAMPUS Cost Avoidance: These costs are calculated one of two 
ways: 1) the total government CHAMPUS costs and units for the workload 
affected are used to calculate the average government cost per unit for admissions 
or outpatient visits avoided in CHAMPUS by ADD and NADD for the care 
covered under this agreement; 2) average government CHAMPUS unit costs are 
provided from some other data source such as the Retrospective Case-Mix 
Analysis System (RCMAS). 
• Sum ofProjected Resource Sharing Expenditures: This is the total amount spent 
on RSAs by the contractor for the entire region. This value must be provided by 
the Lead Agent and is used to determine whether the proposed RSA expenditures 
and the resulting savings are already included in the bid price. The Lead Agent 
monitors these expenditures and informs the MTF when the contractor has 
exceeded the projected expenditures in the bid price so that the profit limitations 
are taken into consideration when sharing any projected gains of future RSAs. 
45 
These are all of the inputs required for the FA W. The MTF and 
contractor may use any estimates or assumptions they feel appropriate to complete the 
individual worksheets. However, as part of the negotiation of the RSA a combined finalized 
worksheet must be completed. The MTF and contractor must agree on each estimate and 
assumption entered under the input section for the final worksheet. The remaining FA W 
sections do not require the MTF or contractor to enter any data or assumptions. 
(2) Best and Final Offer (BAFO) Data Page. This page is provided 
by OASD(HA) with the worksheet template for each of the MCSCs. This page reflects the 
original data in the contractor's BAFO. OASD(HA) will provide a revised version of this 
page based on the results of the preliminary and final actual DCP data. The BAFO data page 
includes the following contractor's data and assumptions: 
• The assumed savings-to-cost ratio used to develop the resource sharing trend 
factor. 
• The number of CHAMPUS eligibles in the DCP and each option period by ADD 
andNADD. 
• The CHAMPUS cost-per-eligible for each option period for categories 1 to 3 
inpatient care by ADD and NADD. 
• The CHAMPUS cost-per-eligible during for each option period for categories 4-7 
outpatient care by ADD and NADD. 
• The percentage of inpatient costs related to admissions requiring NASs during the 
DCP by ADD and NADD. 
• The number of inpatient NASs without the RSA in the DCP and the option periods 
by ADD and NADD. 
• The number ofCHAMPUS outpatient visits in the DCP by ADD and NADD. 
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• The volume trade-offfactor assumed in the contract for outpatient visits (this is 
used to calculate the "0" factor adjustment). 
• The number ofMTF outpatient visits (non-OB/GYN, there is no such thing as an 
OB/GYN outpatient visit in the civilian sector so these figures are subtracted out, 
also does not include partnership visits as they are counted as CHAMPUS visits) 
without the RSA in the option periods by ADD and NADD. 
• The contractor's proposed profit rate for overall health care costs for each option 
period. 
(3) Five Section Output ofFinancial Analysis Worksheet. 
• Section I This section estimates the net resource sharing savings under this 
agreement which would already be reflected in the contractor's proposed bid price, 
based on the savings: cost ratio used to develop the resource sharing trend factor 
in the contractor's BAFO. This analysis ensures that the determination of the 
contractor's workload credit for resource sharing reflects those savings to the 
government which the contractor already included in its bid price for the contract. 
If the case page indicates that the sum of the expenditures for the RSAs already 
approved exceeds the aggregate Category 8 RS expenditures in the contractor's 
BAFO, then none of the savings from the proposed RSA would be reflected in the 
contractor's BAFO. 
• Section II This section estimates the effect of the RSA, including the contractor's 
workload credit, on the MTF utilization adjustment in the Bid Price Adjustment 
Formula (i.e., the "0" factor adjustment). This section calculates the "0" factor 
with and without the proposed RSA, and calculates the government savings 
associated with any partial contractor workload credit. Partial workload credit 
for the contractor would result in a lower "0" factor due to increased MTF 
utilization and therefore a lower adjusted bid price. 
• Section III This section estimates the actual savings (i.e., cost avoidance) in 
CHAMPUS category 1-7 health care costs as a result of the RSA. These savings 
are based on the projected number of CHAMPUS admissions and/or outpatient 
visits avoided as a result of the proposed RSA and the cost of each unit avoided 
in CHAMPUS. 
• Section IV This section estimates the residual gain in CHAMPUS (i.e., the 
difference between the APHCSC and the AHCSC) under the proposed RSA. This 
section also estimates the government and contractor portions of these gains, since 
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the gains would be subject to risk sharing between the government and the 
contractor. These gains are for one particular agreement and in order for any of the 
gains to be realized the AHCSC must be lower than the APHCSC for the entire 
region during the option period. 
• Section V This section poses the two necessary questions and provides the 
answers to those questions to complete the analysis. First, is the contractor credit 
for resource sharing workload assumed in the analysis appropriate? Second, does 
the analysis indicate that the proposed RSA would be cost-effective for the 
government from the .MHSS perspective? The answers to these questions are 
automatically determined and presented in the worksheet. 
It is recommended that the answer to both questions be "yes" before 
proceeding with the agreement. If the answer to the question concerning cost-effectiveness 
to the government is "no", the contractor and MTF may reevaluate the assumptions for the 
volume trade-off factors, responsibility for marginal costs, CHAMP US allowable discount, 
or varying the risk sharing provisions within the worksheet. If the answer to the question 
regarding workload credit is "no", the MTF and contractor may negotiate the workload 
credit. In most cases this will only occur after the contractor has exceeded the BAFO's 
Category 8 RS expenditures. 
If it is not possible to negotiate the estimates, assumptions, or 
workload credit in order to get a "yes" response to both questions then the proposed RSA 
should not be approved unless extenuating circumstances exist that compel the agreement to 
be approved. In situations where a positive outcome cannot be reached through negotiation 
it may be more viable to use another alternative (i.e., resource support) or reject the 
agreement and let the service be absorbed by standard CHAMPUS. 
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3. Monitoring Resource Sharing Agreements 
Since the RSA was determined to be cost-effective based on estimates and 
assumptions it very important that RSAs are continually monitored to ensure the agreements 
are actually cost-effective. However, there is currently no formal policy or standardized 
method for monitoring RSAs. MTFs should frequently examine the workload the RSA has 
generated and compare it with expectations to evaluate how the RSA is performing. 
However, it is difficult for the MTFs to measure the RSAs effect on CHAMPUS workload 
due to the time lag associated with CHAMPUS claims data. 
4. Overview and Summary 
The responsibility for initiating and recommending RSAs currently rests on both the 
MTF and the Contractor. The Lead Agent provides a regional coordination of RSAs for 
monitoring the dollar amounts spent on RSAs by the contractor for all MTFs within their 
respective Region. The monitoring of expenditures by the Lead Agent is important when 
determining the amount of workload that will be credited to the contractor under the RSA 
because of its impact on the bid price adjustments. The Lead Agent also provides assistance 
in evaluating RSAs for cost-effectiveness. 
Since the Contractor's bid price already reflects anticipated savings through the use 
ofRSAs and the government has already realized savings through this reduced price, it is in 
the best interest ofboth parties to pursue RSAs. However, before an RSA can be established 
it must be proven cost-effective for both the government and the contractor. MTFs should 
be looking for "win-win" agreements in which both the contractor and the government share 
in the savings. Sometimes contractors are willing to enter into "win-lose" agreements if the 
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resource sharing counts toward their planned amount of savings to the government. 
MTFs and contractors are provided a tool, the FAW, for evaluating potential 
agreements. This worksheet is the primary tool used to evaluate potential RSAs for their 
cost-effectiveness to both the government and the contractor. In the next chapter we will 
discuss specific case studies in which Resource Sharing has been used to avoid CHAMPUS 
costs and optimize MTF resources. 
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IV. APPLICATION OF RESOURCE SHARING AGREEMENTS 
A. GENERAL 
This chapter provides case studies of RSAs and subsequent concerns of the RS 
program. As mentioned previously there are three categories ofRS: 1) CHAMPUS cost 
avoidance, 2) recaptured CHAMPUS workload, and 3) CHAMPUS partnership conversions. 
One case study is based on an actual internal cost avoidance RSA that was developed for a 
major medical center for colposcopy services. The identity of the MTF is not important. The 
actual numbers used in evaluating the RSA are disguised because some of the data contained 
in the actual agreement are proprietary. 
In addition, two other case studies will be utilized to show an internal recaptured 
CHAMPUS workload RSA for Podiatry services and an internal Partnership conversion RSA 
for Pediatrics. While there are some differences in the overall evaluation of each type of 
agreement the process of completing and utilizing the FA W is the same for all three types of 
RSAs. 
Since the majority of RSAs involve internal agreements as opposed to external 
agreements, the focus here is on internal RSAs. The lack of a formalized Financial Worksheet 
available to all Health Service Regions to evaluate external agreements is another reason for 
not addressing them in this thesis. 
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B. COST A VOIDANCE RESOURCE SHARING AGREEMENT 
1. General 
The cost avoidance type ofRSAs result from changes in MTF utilization due to the 
loss of an MTF provider that existed in the DCP or increases in workload that did not exist 
in the DCP. For example, if a certain service was provided by an MTF provider during the 
DCP then it was counted as MTF workload. If subsequent to the DCP the MTF loses the 
provider then the decrease in MTF workload associated with the lost provider will result in 
decreased MTF utilization in comparison with the DCP. The decrease in MTF utilization 
results in a higher "0" factor at bid price adjustment which in turns increases the contractor's 
cost that the government pays for in higher prices. 
Another example of a situation where the contractor's cost may increase is when the 
MTF workload for a particular service increases beyond the point where the MTF reaches its 
capacity. As a result, the extra workload must be seen by the contractor which increases the 
CHAMPUS cost. 
In both examples, RS is a potential tool to avoid the additional CHAMPUS costs 
associated with the above changes. It is assumed that through using RSAs the contractor will 
be able to provide the services at a lower cost in the MTF than under their civilian network 
for TRICARE. This is verified through the Financial Analysis Worksheet. 
The MTF must be aware that there will be additional costs associated with this type 
ofRSA at bid price adjustment, because this workload was either counted as MTF W<?rkload 
during the DCP or did not exist during the DCP. The amount of increase is dependent on the 
amount of"workload credit" given to the contractor for the particular RSA On the surface 
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this does not sound like much of a savings since the contract price is still going to be higher 
at bid price adjustment regardless of whether we do the RSA or not. However, it is important 
to note that if this workload was not being seen in the MTF under the RSA agreement then 
the workload would be seen under TRICARE through the civilian network at a higher cost. 
This type of an agreement is one in which we are minimizing the cost associated with losing 
a provider or incurring additional workload by implementing an RSA. 
One of the problems associated with evaluating this type of agreement involves the 
determination of the VTF. As mentioned above it is assumed that the health care provided 
through the RSA is less costly than under the civilian network established for TRICARE. In 
most cases, however, the amount of workload seen under TRICARE for the same service will 
be less than the workload seen in the MTF. This is a result of such factors as free care in the 
MTF and co-pays associated with TRICARE. There is currently no standardized method for 
determining VTFs. 
2. Sample Case Study of a Cost Avoidance RSA 
The American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology published a new standard for 
colposcopy examinations in the Spring of 1995 which increased the need for this service. In 
the past colposcopy examinations were required subsequent to two abnormal pap smear tests 
being returned on the patient. Under the new standard this service is now required after one 
abnormal pap smear. At the time this change in standards was issued all colposcopy services 
were provided in house at the MTF. The MTF now had a requirement for additional 
workload that could not be done entirely in-house with current resources. The workload 
associated with these new requirements was not in the DCP data and therefore was going to 
53 
be subject to bid price adjustment. 
The MTF initially discovered the additional workload requirements through 
notification from the Head of the Department providing the service of a change in the 
standard of care. In addition there was an in the increase in the number of disengagements 
for colposcopys. A disengagement is a form issued to eligible beneficiaries to seek care under 
CHAMPUS when their care cannot be provided by the MTF. 
The MTF then had to determine the best way to meet this additional workload 
requirement. As mentioned earlier, in most cases the MTF should first seek other means to 
meet the additional workload requirements before using RSAs. In this case the MTF 
increased its own utilization through training additional providers within the MTF and satellite 
clinics to perform colposcopys. While this increased the MTF's utilization in providing 
colposcopys it still did not cover all of the new workload. Thus, the MTF began the process 
described in the following sections for preparing a potential RSA. 
a. Workload 
This RSA process began by determining the number of disengagements issued 
for colposcopy service after the MTF had reached its full capacity. At this point the MTF 
reviewed the type of patients disengaged to ensure the majority were CHAMP US eligible. 
In order for the RSA to produce the necessary cost savings/avoidance, the majority of the 
patients should be CHAMPUS eligible. The MTF then began working with the department 
to develop a statement of work that included the scope of work, the hours of service, number 
of providers and support personnel needed, and a ceiling for the expected number of visits per 
month. The MTF estimated the additional demand based on the number of disengagements 
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completed since the change in the standard of care. Placing a ceiling on the number ofRS 
visits prevents shifting of workload previously done by the MTF to the contractor. 
As stated above, in this type of agreement there will be an increase in the 
contractor's cost at bid price adjustment due to the new workload performed under the RSA 
that was not included in the DCP. It is important that the amount of workload that was being 
done by the MTF during the DCP continue to be performed in the MTF. Maintaining the 
MTF' s baseline established in the DCP avoids having the contractor's cost further increased 
by any additional workload due to a decrease in MTF utilization. If the MTF' s workload 
does decrease from the baseline established in the DCP, there will be additional costs at bid 
price adjustment. Conversely, if the present MTF workload exceeds the DCP workload, then 
MTF utilization has increased and there should be a decrease in contractor's cost at bid price 
adjustment. 
For example, if the current workload for this procedure is 150 visits and the 
MTF was doing 100 visits during the DCP then MTF providers must account for at least 100 
visits. This avoids the effect of two cost increases at bid price adjustment, one increase for 
the additional workload to be performed under the RSA and another increase due to a 
decrease in MTF utilization. If the MTF saw 110 visits then the remaining 40 visits were 
done under the RSA and at bid price adjustment two of events would take place: 1) the 
contractor's cost would be increased, assuming 100% workload credit, by the RSA workload, 
in this case 40 visits, and 2) the government's cost would be decreased due to the increase 
in MTF utilization relative to the DCP (i.e., going from 100 visits to 110 visits). Ifthe MTF 
saw 90 visits then the remaining 60 visits were done under the RSA and at bid price 
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adjustment the contractor's cost would be increased, assuming 100% workload credit, by the 
RSA workload, in this case 60 visits. If the adjustment for 50 visits was expected under the 
RSA, however, the government's cost would increase further as a result of the decrease in 
MTF utilization relative to the DCP (i.e., going from 100 visits to 90 visits). 
b. Marginal Costs 
The next step involved determining the marginal costs associated with the 
RSA While there is no standardized method for determining the marginal costs, the .MEPRS 
cost data is commonly used. The MTF estimates such marginal costs as ancillary services and 
supply expenses for the RSA These costs were determined to be approximately $8,540 per 
year. If the agreement involved a lost provider rather than new workload, the MTF marginal 
costs (i.e., pharmacy, lab, supplies) would not be as big a factor in evaluating the agreement. 
The reason it would not be a major factor is because the marginal costs were already being 
incurred as a result of the MTF provider. 
c. Submission of Request 
When all the requirements and marginal costs were identified a request for the 
RSA was submitted to the contractor, and a copy to the Lead Agent. It contained the 
following: a short narrative of the proposed scope of work, estimates of the types and 
amounts of providers and support personnel, qualification requirements for providers needed, 
and MTF specific cost and workload information associated with the past year's patient 
workload and ancillary workload. 
d. Establishing Volume Trade-Off Factor 
Another part of the process involved the contractor and MTF agreeing upon 
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the VTF to be used in the FAW. As discussed previously, the VTF assumes that not all 
patients disengaged for a particular MTF service will seek that treatment under CHAMPUS. 
The service provided for this particular agreement was the result of negative pap smears 
which could have posed serious health concerns if not addressed. Therefore, it was assumed 
that most of the patients disengaged would seek treatment under CHAMPUS. Therefore, a 
VTF of 1.2 was used for the cost-effectiveness analysis. 
e. Cost Analysis 
Once this information was received the contractor prepared a cost analysis 
using the FA W to determine the cost-effectiveness of the agreement, as well as do their own 
cost benefit analysis to determine their costs and estimated savings (CHAMPUS costs 
avoided). The MTF' s cost analysis did not include the completion of the FA W as part of their 
submission request. The MTF did provide all necessary cost estimates and assumptions to 
allow the contractor to complete the F AW. In fact, other MTFs in two HSRs were not using 
the FA W to conduct their own analysis, but supplied the contractor with the necessary input 
factors for the contractor to complete the FA W. In all cases the MTF and Lead Agent 
thoroughly reviewed and verified the contractor's FA W and any other cost analyses before 
approving the RSA. 
There were several reasons stated for the worksheet not being used, among 
them were: 1) some MTFs did not have the necessary software to use the worksheet, 2) did 
not know where to get the information needed to complete the worksheet, and 3) did not 
understand how to use the worksheet. 
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f Bid Price Savings 
The FA W revealed that the proposed Category 8, RS expenditures, for this 
RSA were already included in the contractor's aggregate spending assumption. As a result 
the MTF and contractor agreed that the contractor receive 100% workload credit for this 
RSA. The next section contains a summary of the FA W contained in Appendix C. 
g. Financial Analysis Worksheet Results 
(1) Section I: Assumed Savings Reflected in BAFO. This section 
determined the amount of Resource Sharing Savings (costs avoided) already reflected in the 
proposed bid price assumptions. The contractor expected to spend approximately $97,891 
in Category 8, resource sharing expenditures, under this RSA. The assumed savings to cost 
ratio that was used to develop the resource sharing trend factor in the original bid price was 
2.2. As a result the expected savings for this agreement was $215,360 ($97,891 x 2.2). 
Thus, the net savings (cost avoided) already reflected in the bid price was $117,469, which 
is the gross savings of$215,360 minus the cost ofthe RSA, $97,891. 
(2) Section II: "0" Factor Impact on Bid Price Adjustment. This 
section estimated the impact of the RSA on MTF utilization (i.e., "0" factor). Since the 
contractor was given 1 00% workload credit for this RSA there was no impact on the "0" 
factor as a result of this agreement. If the agreement had provided only partial workload 
credit to the conttactor, then there would have been a decrease in the "0" factor since the 
MTF workload would not be adjusted for the contractor's total workload credit. 
(3) Section III: Impact on CHAMPUS Claims Costs. This section 
estimated the actual savings (CHAMPUS cost avoided) as a result of the RSA. The workload 
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enabled by this RSA was estimated to be 439 ADD and 695 NADD. Using the VTF of 1.2 
the number ofCHAMPUS visits avoided was determined to be 366 ADD and 579 NADD. 
The contractor's cost analysis estimated $322,328 in CHAMPUS costs avoided. These costs 
avoided did not take into consideration the VTF. Therefore, dividing the total estimated costs 
avoided (without VTF) by the total number ofMTF visits enabled by the RSA, the average 
government cost per unit for CHAMPUS visits avoided was determined to be $285 for both 
ADD and NADD. Then taking the VTF into consideration the estimated CHAMPUS costs 
avoided were determined to be (366 ADD visits x $285) $104,263 plus (579 NADD visits 
x $285) $165,063 for a total of$269,325. 
( 4) Section IV: Risk Sharing Impact. This section addressed the 
residual gain or risk sharing impact of the RSA. In this agreement the government shared in 
80% of the risk and the contractor shared in 20% of the risk. As stated above the 
contractor's Category 8, RS expenditures, were estimated to be $97,891. In order to 
calculate the net decrease in actual CHAMPUS costs from the estimated CHAMPUS costs 
avoided (calculated in Section III) subtract the contractor's RS expenditures, $269,325 -
$97,891 = $171434. The amount of savings (costs avoided) reflected in the up-front bid 
price (calculated in Section I) are then subtracted to calculate the residual gain to be shared 
between the government and the contractor, $171,434 - $117,469 = $53,965. The 
government and contractor then split the $72,598 using the 80% -20% risk sharing guidelines. 
The resulting government gain is $43,172 (80% x $53,965) and the resulting contractor gain 
is $10,793 (20% x $53,965). 
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(5) Section V: Results of Analysis. This section provided the final 
results of the analysis concerning the contractor workload credit and cost-effectiveness from 
the l\1HSS perspective. The analysis showed that the contractor's initial contractor RS 
expenditures, $97,891, and the resulting savings were already included in the BAFO price. 
Therefore, the agreement yielded a "yes" answer to the "workload credit" question. The 
contractor's residual gain was calculated to be $10,793 which represented a residual profit 
of 11.03%. The residual profit is calculated by dividing the RS expenditures by the residual 
gain for the RSA ($10,793/$97,891). The contractor's proposed profit rate for the overall 
health care costs from the BAFO was 3.5%. Since the RS expenditures and savings (costs 
avoided) were determined to be reflected in the BAFO price it is appropriate to give the 
contractor 100% workload credit for this RSA If the expenditures and savings were not a 
part of the BAFO price the contractor's residual profit rate on any gain associated with an 
RSA should not exceed the proposed 3.5% profit rate for overall health care costs. The 
analysis for cost-effectiveness took the projected MTF marginal expenditures, $8,540, and 
subtracted the costs from the projected government gain to calculate the net government 
savings (cost avoided) under the RSA The projected government gain is the up-front bid 
price savings plus the 80% of the residual savings associated with the RSA, 
($117,469+$43, 172) $160,641. The net government savings is expected to be $160,641 -
$8,540 = $152 101. Government gains exceed government expenditures therefore the 
agreement yields a "yes" answer to the cost-effectiveness question. 
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The Financial Worksheet Analysis revealed the RSA elicited "yes", 
"yes" responses to both of the questions needed to implement the RSA. Upon completion 
of all analyses and agreements among all parties concerning the assumptions and scope of 
work of the RSA, signatures are obtained from the contractor, Lead Agent, and MTF 
Commander to approve the RSA. The actual RSA used as a basis for this study is scheduled 
to be implemented in July 1996. 
C. RECAPTURE OF CHAMPUS WORKLOAD RESOURCE SHARING 
AGREEMENT 
1. General 
The recapture ofCHAMPUS workload type ofRSA involves an agreement which 
brings workload into the MTF that was previously done under CHAMPUS. It is assumed 
that the contractor, through the use ofRS, can provide the care for less cost than under the 
civilian network associated with TRICARE. This is because the contractor should be able 
to contract with providers at a discount rate since they will have no overhead or supply costs. 
The costs and assumptions must be agreed upon by the contractor and MTF just as in the 
other types of agreements. These costs and assumptions include the contractor's cost of the 
agreement, the MTF' s marginal costs, the CHAMPUS costs saved (avoided), establishment 
ofa VTF, the workload estimate, and a determination ofthe contractor's "workload credit". 
2. Sample Case Study of a Recapture ofCHAMPUS Workload RSA 
This sample case study centers around an RSA developed to provide Podiatry 
services. It was found through a review of referral reports that an MTF was disengaging a 
high number of podiatry cases. The MTF currently had only one military Podiatrist who was 
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operating at full capacity. 
Efforts were made through a variety of avenues to bring some or all of this workload 
back into the MTF. The MTF tried to establish another military billet for a Podiatrist but the 
request was turned down. The MTF considered using a personnel services contract for a 
Podiatrist. However, the time frame for this process was approximately one year and the MTF 
did not have the operating funds to implement this type of contract. Another option was the 
use of resource support but, again the MTF did not have the operating funds to purchase the 
services through the MCS contractor. The MTF then decided to review further the types of 
patients that were being disengaged. The assessment indicated that the majority of patients 
were CHAMP US eligible. Since most of the workload was CHAMPUS eligibles it became 
apparent that an attempt to recapture this CHAMPUS workload could be done with an RSA. 
The MTF then began the process of requesting an RSA. 
The MTF began working with the Podiatry Department to develop the requirements 
needed to recapture the CHAMPUS workload. This included the development of the scope 
of work, the hours of service, number of providers and support personnel needed, and an 
estimated number of visits per month. It was important to provide good workload estimates 
for the same reasons in the cost avoidance RSA. Since this agreement involves a service 
provided by both MTF and RS providers, the MTF providers must continue to perform the 
same amount of workload as was counted in the DCP. By maintaining the baseline visits in 
the DCP the MTF ensures against a negative bid price adjustment for decreased MTF 
utilization. 
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In determining the requirements for the agreement the MTF calculated the expected 
MTF marginal expenditures associated with the potential RSA. This was done using the 
l\1EPRS cost data just as in the cost avoidance RSA. The MEPRS data was used to estimate 
the marginal costs in the area of pharmacy, lab, radiology, anesthesia, surgical suite, and 
recovery room costs. The total of these costs was expected to be around $1,500 per year. 
When all the requirements and marginal costs were identified a request for the RSA 
was submitted to the contractor, and a copy to the Lead Agent, that contained a short 
narrative of the proposed scope of work, estimates of the types and amounts of providers and 
support personnel, qualification requirements for providers needed, and MTF specific cost 
and, patient and ancillary workload information. 
In this case study the MTF was able to complete the FA W based on their own cost 
and workload estimates, and assumptions concerning the "workload credit" and VTF. 
This scenario assumes that the contractor has already exceeded the amount of 
Category 8 expenditures stated in the BAFO and the government has realized all of the up-
front bid price reduction savings. Therefore, the "workload credit" for all subsequent 
agreements should be negotiated and the contractor's profit rate should be limited to the 
BAFO profit rate for overall health care costs. With the above in mind the MTF and 
contractor compared their individual Financial Analysis Worksheet results and began 
negotiating the key assumptions and cost data in order to come up with an RSA that was 
cost-effective to both. 
For this agreement the MTF and contractor agreed upon a 4 5% "workload credit". 
The negotiated workload credit of 45% was considered cost-effective to both the government 
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and contractor and also ensured that the contractor's profit on the RSA did not exceed the 
BAFO profit rate on overall health care costs. The results of the analysis with the contractor 
spending $95,000 for the agreement, the MTF marginal expenditures of $1,500, a 45% 
"workload credit", estimated visits of525 ADD and 300 NADD, an 80-20 split for any gains, 
a 1. 5 VTF, and an estimated cost of $225 per visit elicited the results in the FA W contained 
in Appendix D and summarized in the next section. 
a. Financial Analysis Worksheet Results 
(1) Section 1: Assumed Savings Reflected in BAFO. This section 
determined the amount of Resource Sharing savings already reflected in the proposed bid 
price assumptions. The contractor expected to spend $95,000 on the RSA. The contractor 
had already exceeded the amount of Category 8 RS expenditures proposed for the option 
period. Therefore, the CHAMPUS savings already reflected in the bid price were $0. 
(2) Section II: "0" Factor Impact on Bid Price Adjustment. This 
section calculated the estimated impact of the RSA on MTF utilization (i.e., the "0" factor 
for outpatient visits) and the decrease in the bid price due to the adjustment of the "0" factor. 
Since the contractor was given a 45% "workload credit", MTF utilization increased by the 
remaining 55%. The "0" factor for ADD without the RSA was 1.166723147, the re-
calculated "0" factor for ADD with the RSA was 1.165896115. The decrease in the "0" 
factor was a result of the MTF increasing their utilization by 289 ADD visits (55% x 525 
visits). The "0" factor for NADD without the RSA was 1.201091634. The re-calculated 
"0" factor for NADD with the RSA was 1.200947100. The decrease in the "0" factor was 
a result of the MTF increasing their utilization by 165 NADD visits (55% x 300 visits). The 
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actual decrease in costs is determined by calculating the costs without the RSA and then 
subtracting out the cost with the RSA. The calculation for the costs without the RSA was 
done by taking the number of CHAMPUS eligibles in the BAFO data by ADD and NADD 
and multiplying by the average outpatient cost (category 4-7 costs) per eligible for ADD and 
NADD and then multiplying the result by the "0" factor for ADD and NADD without the 
RSA. The cost calculation with the RSA multiplies the number of CHAMPUS eligibles in 
the BAFO data by ADD and NADD by the average outpatient cost (category 4-7 costs) per 
eligible for ADD and NADD. The result is then multiplied by the "0" factor for ADD and 
NADD with the RSA. The sum ofthe difference between the two for ADD and NADD 
represents the decrease in government costs as a result of the RSA. For ADD the calculation 
is (68,573 CHAMPUS eligibles x $221 average outpatient cost per eligible x 1.166723147 
outpatient "0" factor without RSA)- (68,573 CHAJ\.1PUS eligibles x $221 average outpatient 
cost per eligible x 1.165896115 outpatient "0" factor with RSA) = $12,519. For NADD the 
calculation is (137,914 CHAMPUS eligibles x $292 average outpatient cost per eligible x 
1.201091634 outpatient "0" factor without RSA)- (137,914 CHAMPUS eligibles x $292 
average outpatient cost per eligible x 1.200947100 outpatient "0" factor with RSA) = 
$5,818. The total decrease in the bid price due to the "0" factor adjustment for this RSA is 
$12,519 + $5,818 = $18.337. 
(3) Section III: Impact on CHAMPUS Claims Costs. This section 
estimated the actual savings (CHAMPUS cost avoided) as a result of the RSA. In this 
agreement the workload enabled by this RSA was estimated to be 525 ADD and 300 NADD, 
using the VTF of 1.5 the number of CHAMPUS visits avoided was 350 ADD and 200 
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NADD. Through the contractor's cost analysis the estimated CHAMPUS costs avoided were 
$185,625, but these costs avoided do not consider the VTF. So dividing the total estimated 
costs avoided (without VTF) by the total number ofMTF visits enabled by the RSA equals 
the average government cost per unit for CHAMPUS visits avoided which was determined 
to be $225 for both ADD and NADD. Using the VTF the estimated CHAMPUS costs 
avoided were (350 ADD visits x $225) $78,750 plus (200 NADD visits x $225) $45,000 for 
a total of$123,750. 
( 4) Section IV: Risk Sharing Impact. This section addressed the 
residual gain or risk sharing impact of the RSA. In this agreement the government shared in 
80% of the risk and the contractor shared in 20% of the risk. As stated above, the 
contractor's Category 8, RS expenditures, were estimated to be $95,000. The net decrease 
in actual CHAMPUS costs equals the estimated CHAMPUS costs avoided (calculated in 
Section III) minus the contractor's RS expenditures or $123,750- $95,000 = $28,750. In 
this case there were no up-front savings reflected in the bid price. However, the decrease in 
the bid price due to the "0" factor adjustment must be subtracted from the net decrease in 
actual CHAMPUS costs to calculate the residual gain to be shared between the government 
and the contractor, $28,7 50 - $18,3 3 7 = $1 0 413. The government and contractor then split 
the $10,413 using the 80% -20% risk sharing guidelines. The resulting government gain is 
$8,330 (80% x $10,413) and the resulting contractor gain is $2,083 (20% x $10,413). 
(5) Section V: Results of Analysis. This section provided the final 
results of the analysis concerning the check of contractor workload credit and cost-
effectiveness from the MHSS perspective. The analysis showed that the contractor's initial 
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RS expenditures, $95,000, were not part of the proposed BAFO expenditures for RS and thus 
there were no resulting savings included in the BAFO price. Since the RS expenditures were 
not reflected in the BAFO price it was appropriate to negotiate the "workload credit" in order 
to make the agreement cost-effective. The contractor was given 45% workload credit for this 
RSA. The contractor's residual gain was calculated to be $2,083 which represented a residual 
profit of 2.19% ($2,083/$95,000). The contractor's proposed profit rate for the overall 
health care costs from the BAFO was 3. 5%. In accordance with the contract policy the 
contractor's profit for this RSA did not exceed the profit rate for overall health care costs. 
Negotiating the "workload credit" at 45% kept the contractor's profit under 3.5% for this 
agreement thereby eliciting a "yes" answer to the appropriateness of the "workload credit". 
The analysis for cost-effectiveness took the projected MTF marginal expenditures, $1,500, 
and subtracted the costs from the projected government gain to calculate the net government 
savings (cost avoided) under the RSA. The projected government gain is the up-front bid 
price savings, which in this RSA was $0, plus the 80% of the residual savings associated with 
the RSA, and the savings from the "0" factor adjustment (0 +$8,330+$18,337) $26.667. The 
net government savings is expected to be $26,667- 1,500 = $25.167. Government gains 
exceed government expenditures therefore the agreement yields a "yes" answer to the cost-
effectiveness question. 
In this example we have seen how RS can produce government savings 
through recapturing CHAMPUS workload and the effects of using RS once the contractor 
has exceeded the proposed expenditures for RS in the BAFO. The government realizes 
savings by providing care in the MTF through the contractor at a lower cost than would be 
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incurred under TRICARE. In this RSA case, to be cost-effective the MTF had to negotiate 
a VTF and "workload credit" that would lower the contractor's profit rate under the BAFO 
proposed profit rate for overall health care costs but at the same time be beneficial to both 
parties. 
D. PARTNERSHIP CONVERSION RESOURCE SHARING AGREEMENT 
1. General 
The Partnership program allowed CHAMPUS eligible beneficiaries to receive 
inpatient or outpatient treatment from civilian providers in an MTF, or from uniformed 
services providers of care in civilian facilities. The premise for these programs is that the care 
provided under the Partnership program is more economical than Standard CHAMPUS. This 
type of agreement involves the conversion of internal/external partnerships at MTFs into 
RSAs. Since the MCSC requires the contractor to provide the civilian network for the 
TRICARE program, all Partnership programs with other third parties are either discontinued 
or converted into an RSA. 
The evaluation of an RSA that involves the conversion of a Partnership is the same 
as that used for Cost Avoidance and Recapture of CHAMPUS workload RSAs. The main 
difference and key factor to be aware of in evaluating this type of agreement involves 
inpatient RSAs. When evaluating an inpatient Partnership for conversion to an RSA the MTF 
must know if the Partnership existed during the DCP. If the Partnership existed during the 
DCP, the MTF needs to determine if CHAMP US admissions for the Partnership were 
counted in the DCP data reported by OCHAMPUS. If the admissions were not counted, then 
the "workload credit" for converting the RSA should be negotiated so that the contractor's 
68 
profit rate is approximately equal to zero. The "workload credit" is negotiated because the 
admissions associated with the Partnership did not exist in the DCP. Therefore, it would not 
be appropriate to give the contractor full credit. If the admissions/visits were counted in the 
DCP then it is appropriate to give the contractor 1 00% workload credit. 
Additionally, when evaluating conversions the MTF should have actual past workload 
counts to use when completing the Financial Analysis Worksheet. By having a baseline 
number of admissions/visits, the determination of the VTF, as well as the estimated costs and 
savings should be easier and more accurate. 
2. Sample Case Study of Partnership Conversion RSA 
This example involves the conversion of a Partnership agreement for outpatient 
Pediatric services. The process for evaluating this type of agreement is a little more simplified 
since there was a baseline for the workload and marginal expenditures associated with the 
Partnership. 
The agreement existed in the DCP and all of the Partnership visits were in the DCP 
data. The contractor's Category 8, RS expenditures, for this agreement were projected to 
be $325,000. The aggregate total spent on RS to date was $1,500,000 which was under the 
BAFO total proposed amount to be spent on RS. Therefore, the agreement was considered 
to be a part of the up-front savings associated with the contractor's reduced bid price and it 
was appropriate to give the contractor 100% "workload credit" for this RSA when evaluating 
the agreement with the Financial Analysis Worksheet. Since the Partnership had already been 
in existence and a baseline established for workload, the contractor and government agreed 
that the VTF should be minimal, and in this case used a VTF of 1.1. The MTF' s marginal 
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expenditures were estimated to be $125,000. The estimate was developed using the MEPRS 
data that existed from the current Partnership. The estimated visits enabled by the RSA were 
also established using the current workload associated with the Partnership. The workload 
was expected to be 8,000 ADD and 14,500 NADD at an average cost per visit of$35. The 
ageement was evaluated using an 80-20 split for any residual gains as a result of the RSA. 
Appendix E contains the results of the FA W based on these assumptions and cost and 
workload estimates. The FA W is summarized in the next section. 
a. Financial Analysis Worksheet Results 
(1) Section I: Assumed Savings Reflected in BAFO. This section 
determined the amount ofResource Sharing Savings (costs avoided) already reflected in the 
proposed bid price assumptions. The contractor expected to spend approximately $325,000 
in Category 8, resource sharing expenditures, under this RSA. The assumed savings to cost 
ratio that was used to develop the resource sharing trend factor in the original bid price was 
2.2. As a result the expected savings (cost avoided) for this agreement was $715,000 
($325,000 x 2.2). The net savings (cost avoided) already reflected in the bid price was 
$3 90,000, which is the gross savings of $715,000 minus the cost of the RSA, $3 25,000. 
(2) Section II: "0" Factor Impact on Bid Price Adjustment. This 
section estimated the impact of the RSA on MTF utilization (i.e., "0" factor). Since the 
contractor was given 100% workload credit for this RSA there was no impact on the "0" 
factor as a result of this agreement. If the agreement had provided only partial workload 
credit to the contractor then there would have been a decrease in the "0" factor since the 
MTF workload would not be totally offset by the contractor's workload credit. 
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(3) Section III: Impact on CHAMPUS Claims Costs. This section 
estimated the actual savings (CHAMPUS cost avoided) as a result of the RSA. In this 
agreement the workload enabled by this RSA was estimated to be 8,000 ADD and 14,500 
NADD. Using the VTF of 1.1 the number ofCHAMPUS visits avoided was 7,273 ADD and 
13,182 NADD. Through the contractor's cost analysis it was determined that the estimated 
CHAMPUS costs avoided were going to be $787,500, before considering the VTF. Dividing 
the total estimated costs avoided (without VTF) by the total number ofMTF visits enabled 
by the RSA equals the average government cost per unit for CHAMPUS visits avoided of $3 5 
per visit for both ADD and NADD. Then taking the VTF into consideration the estimated 
CHAMPUS costs avoided were determined to be (7,273 ADD visits x $35) $254,545 plus 
(13, 182 NADD visits x $35) $461,364 for a total of$715,909. 
( 4) Section IV: Risk Sharing Impact. This section addressed the 
residual gain or risk sharing impact of the RSA. In this agreement the government shared in 
8 0% of the risk and the contractor shared in 20% of the risk. As stated above the 
contractor's Category 8, RS expenditures, were estimated to be $325,000. The net decrease 
in actual CHAMPUS costs is equal to the estimated CHAMPUS costs avoided (calculated 
in Section III) minus the contractor's RS expenditures or $715,909- $325,000 = $390,909. 
The amount of savings (costs avoided) reflected in the up-front bid price (calculated in 
Section I) is then subtracted to calculate the residual gain to be shared between the 
government and the contractor, $390,909 - $390,000 = $909. The government and 
contractor then split the $909 using the 80% -20% risk sharing guidelines established. 
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The resulting government gain is $727 (80% x $909) and the resulting contractor gain is $182 
(20% X $909). 
(5) Section V: Results of Analysis. This section provided the final 
results of the analysis concerning the check of contractor workload credit and cost-
effectiveness from the MHSS perspective. The analysis showed that the contractor's initial 
contractor RS expenditures, $325,000, and the resulting savings were already included in the 
BAFO price. The contractor's residual gain was calculated to be $182 which represented a 
residual profit rate of0.06%. The contractor's proposed profit rate for the overall health care 
costs from the BAFO was 3 .5%. Since the RS expenditures and savings (costs avoided) were 
determined to be reflected in the BAFO price, it was appropriate to give the contractor 100% 
workload credit for this RSA. If the expenditures and savings were not a part of the BAFO 
price the contractor's residual profit rate on any gain associated with an RSA should not 
exceed the proposed profit rate for overall health care costs, in this case 3.5%. The analysis 
for cost-effectiveness took the projected MTF marginal expenditures, $125,000, and 
subtracted the costs from the projected government gain to calculate the net government 
savings (cost avoided) under the RSA. The projected government gain is the up-front bid 
price savings plus 80% of the residual savings associated with the RSA, ($390,000+$727) 
$390,727. The net government savings is expected to be $390,727- $125,000 = $265,727. 
Government gains exceed government expenditures; therefore the agreement yields a "yes" 
answer to the cost-effectiveness question. 
This type of RSA is probably the simplest one to implement and 
evaluate for cost-effectiveness because the service is already being provided under the 
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Partnership and the MTF and contractor have baseline data on the patient and ancillary 
services workload to use in the analysis. However, MTFs must be careful to not assume that 
just because a Partnership was in place that an RSA for the same services will be cost-
effective. 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the actual process of identifying and evaluating the different 
types ofRSAs through illustrative examples and revealed how the different agreements affect 
the cost of the MCSC. Table 3 on the following page summarizes the key computations for 
the three different cases discussed in this chapter. This data is found in the text as well as 
detailed in Appendices C, D, and E. 
Note that the major parts of each case are the gains to the government and the 
contractor. In each case both parties are expected to gain from the RSA. It should also be 
noted that the contractor and or government may in certain instances be willing to incur a 
loss. For example, to meet the BAFO's Category 8 RS expenditures the contractor may 
agree to an RSA of agree to less workload credit. In the case of the government, an MTF 
may enter into an agreement that may incur a loss due to limited access of health care in a 
rural area, due to a readiness requirement, or in order to support a General Medical Education 
program. 
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CASE STUDY Cost CHAMP US Partnership 
Avoidance Recapture Conversion 
Calculations ofBAFO Net Savings for RSAs 
Proposed Category 8 RS Expenditures ($97,891) ($95,000) ($325,000) 
Savings: Cost Ratio 2.2 N/A 2.2 
Gross Savings in Bid Price $215,360 N/A $715,000 
Net Savings in Bid Price (Gross Savings-RS Exp.) $117,469 N/A $390,000 
Included in BAFO Spending Assumptions YES NO YES 
Calculation ofResidual CHAMPUS Gain 
CHAMPUS Cat. 1-7 Costs A voided $269,325 $123,750 $715,909 
Less: Cat. 8 RS Expenditures ($97 891) ($95 000) ($325,000) 
Net Decrease in CHAMPUS Costs $171,434 $28,750 $390,909 
Less: Net Savings in BAFO Price ($117,469) N/A ($390,000) 
Less: Decrease in Cat. l-7 Costs Due to "0" Factor $0 ($18,337) $0 
Adjustment 
Residual CHAMPUS Gain to be Shared $53,965 $10,413 $909 
Calculation of Net Government MHSS Savings 
Add: Government Savings from "0" Factor Adjustment $0 $18,337 $0 
Add: Gov't Share ofResidual CHAMPUS Gain (80%) $43,172 $8,330 $727 
Add: Projected Gov't Gain in BAFO Price $117,469 $0 $390,000 
Less: MTF Marginal Costs ($8,540) ($1,500) ($125,000) 
Net Government MHSS Savings $152,101 $25,167 $265,727 
Contractor Share of CHAMPUS Gain (20%) $10,793 $2,083 $182 
Table 3. Summary ofKey Computations for 3 Cases 
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARY 
This research examined and evaluated the Resource Sharing program contained in the 
MCSC. The program was established as a part of the TRICARE MCSCs to provide a means 
to reduce CHAMPUS health care costs by enhancing the capabilities of the MTF. 
The research was designed to address the current process for identifYing, evaluating, 
and utilizing RSAs and how RSAs affect the costs of the MCSC. We identified the roles of 
the MTF, Contractor, and Lead Agent in the RSA process and identified the key elements and 
assumptions utilized in evaluating the different types ofRSAs. 
Chapter II provided background information on civilian managed cared programs, an 
overview of the :MHSS, and introduced DOD's managed care program, TRICARE. Next, 
in Chapter III we presented a detailed overview of the Resource Sharing program that 
identified the key elements ofRSAs in the MCSC and documented the process for identifYing 
and evaluating RSAs for cost-effectiveness. Lastly, in Chapter IV we illustrated the 
application ofRSAs through the use of case studies for the three types ofRSAs. The case 
studies provided an illustrative method for distinguishing the differences between the types 
ofRSAs and how to interpret and use the FA W. 
B. CONCLUSION 
The analysis revealed some areas of concern associated with the RS program. These 
concerns involve certain key elements of RS such as, bid price savings, MTF incentives, 
standardized training, workload credit, marginal costs and volume trade-off factors. 
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In addition it has been demonstrated that the FA W analysis relies on a series of key 
cost and workload estimates and assumptions to determine the cost-effectiveness of all three 
types of internal RSAs. Since the cost-effectiveness of an RSA is based on estimates and 
assumptions it is apparent that the monitoring ofRSAs is key once the RSA is in place. This 
section provides a discussion of the major concerns of the RS program and the importance 
of monitoring RSA agreements for cost-effectiveness once in place. 
1. Areas of Concern and Recommendations 
a. Bid Price Savings 
There is some question among MTFs as to whether the up-front bid price 
savings should be considered for agreements that involve the replacement of an MTF provider 
or involve new workload. The argument is that there were no previous CHAMPUS costs 
associated with either of these type of agreements so how can there be savings. In addition, 
these requirements were probably not included in the contractor's resource sharing plan so 
how could the contractor have included these services in the bid price savings associated with 
the aggregate spending assumptions in the BAFO for Category 8 costs? 
According to Kennell and Associates "cost savings" and "costs avoided" are 
used interchangeably in determining the cost-effectiveness of an RSA. In this type of 
agreements there may not be an actual savings from previous costs but there will be 
significant CHAMP US costs avoided as a result of the RSA. There are also no guidelines on 
which type of agreements should be considered a part of the up-front bid price reduction. 
Although the contractor is required to submit a resource sharing plan the agreements do not 
necessarily have to be a part of the plan to be considered a part of the reduced bid price. 
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Thus, when evaluating RSA cost-effectiveness, RSA proposals should reflect the savings 
associated with the contractor's bid price reduction until the contractor reaches the Category 
8 expenditures for RS (Kennel and Associates, 1996). 
b. MTF Incentives 
There are no direct incentives for the individual MTF to actively pursue RSAs. 
While the MTF should be cooperating with the contractor in identifying and implementing 
potential RSAs there are no direct monetary savings given to the MTF for the RS program. 
The MCSC is for the entire HSR and gains and losses in BP A apply to the HSR not particular 
MTFs. In addition to no direct savings, the MTF is expected to fund the marginal 
expenditures associated with any potential RSAs out of their existing operating budget or 
request Service funds. So not only are the MTFs not actually seeing any of the savings (or 
losses) but the MTF is incurring additional operating costs. All savings associated with RS 
are accumulated at the OASD(HA) level. 
Efforts are currently under way to channel the RS savings to the three Services 
to provide funding to MTF Commanders for the marginal expenditures. It may be possible 
in the future to determine the specific impact of an MTF' s RSA on the "0" factor and 
gain/loss sharing corridors and reward specific MTFs for their positive contribution at bid 
price adjustment. In addition to direct savings it is imperative that MTF commanders have 
a common focus on the overall goals of the MHSS. In the case ofRS that goal is to optimize 
MTF resources while also decreasing CHAMPUS costs. 
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c. Standardized Training 
There is no standardized training on the use ofRSAs and their impact on the 
contract price. Several Health Service Regions have developed their own manuals on how 
to do RS but there is no OASD(HA) approved training on RSAs other than the user's manual 
developed by Kennell and Associates for the Financial Analysis Worksheet. With no standard 
training program there are often conflicting opinions on the interpretation of some of the 
contract policy and procedures for using RSAs. There are differences between the MCSCs, 
but the overall process for identifying and evaluating RSAs is for the most part the same 
among all HSRs. A training program is being implemented in January 1997 to address this 
issue. The Naval Postgraduate School has been contracted by OASD(HA) and the three 
military medical departments to develop and deliver a four day program to resource 
managers. 
d Workload Credit 
When evaluating cost avoidance RSAs involving the replacement of an MTF 
provider some MTFs did not feel they should give the contractor "workload credit" and also 
incur a negative bid price adjustment due to decreased MTF utilization. This opinion 
accentuates the need for a standardized training program on the use ofRSAs. All MTFs do 
not have a clear understanding of how the process works and the positive and negative effects 
ofRS in relation to contract costs. 
Closer analysis reveals that there will be a negative BP A regardless of whether 
the MTF uses an RSA or not. This is due to a decrease in MTF utilization as a result of 
losing a provider for services that was included in the DCP. Even though some MTFs do not 
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feel it is in their best interest to enter into this type of agreement, potential government 
savings may exist. 
It is assumed that the health care services in question can be provided in the MTF at 
a lower cost using an RSA than under TRICARE thereby reducing the overall health care 
costs of the contractor. 
e. Marginal Costs and Volume Trade-Off Factor 
The MHSS does not have a patient level cost accounting system. As a result 
MEPRS is currently the only system to use when estimating the marginal costs of an 
additional patient. There is some concern that MEPRS may not provide the most useful 
information for determining cost per patient but it is currently the best information system 
available in the MHSS. 
There is currently no method for determining the appropriate VTF when 
evaluating an RSA. It is developed based on rough estimates and assumptions made by the 
contractor and MTF. In addition, it is difficult to monitor once the RSA is in place due to the 
time lag in CHAMPUS data. 
f. MTF Utilization or "0" Factor 
MTFs are not able to determine the impact on BP A as a result of implementing 
an RSA that replaces a lost provider or performs new workload. While we know the "0" 
factor will increase causing the contractor's cost to increase we do not know by how much. 
OASD(HA)'s contractor, Kennell and Associates, has developed a desktop model to conduct 
informal BP As which would assist MTFs in determining the cost impact when evaluating 
RSAs. 
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This model is being tested within the MRS S and is expected to be disseminated to all HSRs. 
g. Financial Analysis Worksheet 
The Financial Analysis Worksheet does not distinguish between the different 
types of RSAs for evaluation purposes. This is a concern that has already been brought to 
the attention of OASD(HA) and they have developed a new worksheet that determines the 
type of agreement being requested before proceeding with the analysis. The new worksheet 
is being tested in two of the HSRs and if it is determined to be more beneficial than the 
current worksheet it will be diserninated to all HSRs. 
In the MCSC it states that the MTF will complete the Financial Analysis 
Worksheet. In the two of the HSRs the MTFs were not completing the worksheet themselves 
but were providing the contractor with the relevant workload and cost information for 
completing the F AW. Although the results of the contractor's worksheet were carefully 
reviewed and analyzed by the MTF and Lead Agent, independent worksheets were not 
completed. The main reason given for the MTFs not completing a worksheet was the lack 
of personnel and necessary training to determine estimates and assumptions when completing 
the worksheet. In most cases the MTF's Managed Care Departments had only one person 
responsible for RSAs and in some cases the individual had other duties as well. 
2. Monitoring Resource Sharing Agreements 
In Chapter III we touched on the importance of monitoring RSAs. The analysis 
completed in Chapter IV has shown that the determination of cost-effectiveness is based 
almost entirely on estimates and assumptions made by the MTF and contractor. These 
estimates and assumptions include: the savings-to-cost ratio in the BAFO, the contractor's 
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Category 8 RS expenditures, the VTF, the MTF's marginal expenditures, the estimated 
workload enabled by the RSA, and the estimated cost per beneficiary category. By varying 
any one of these factors the RSA has the potential to go from one initially seen as cost-
effective to both parties to one which may not be cost-effective to the government, the 
contractor or both. 
For example, if we go back to Table 3 and look at the "cost avoidance" case study we 
see that the net government savings is expected to be $15 2, 101 and the contractor's share of 
the CHAMPUS gain is $10,793. This is based on a savings-to-cost ratio of2.2, $97,891 in 
Category 8 RS expenditures, a VTF ofl.2, MTF marginal expenditures of$8,540, 439 ADD 
and 695 NADD visits, and an average cost of $285 per visit for both ADD and NADD. If 
we change the VTF to 2.5 and increase the MTF marginal expenditures to $15,000 we get 
a totally different result in MHSS savings and contractor gains. The net government savings 
are now expected to be $33,602 and there is no CHAMPUS gain to be shared, only a loss of 
$17,217. 
In another scenario we can show the importance of tracking the estimated workload 
to be enabled by the RSA. The "Partnership conversion" case study (see Table 3) estimated 
the workload enabled by the RSA to be 8,000 ADD and 14,500 NADD. These estimates 
coupled with the estimates and assumptions of the key factors discussed above elicited net 
government savings of$265,727 and a share of the CHAMPUS gain in the amount of$182 
to the contractor. If at the end ofthe period the workload was actually only 5,000 ADD and 
10,000 NADD, and all other estimates and assumptions remained the same, the government 
savings would have been $74,818 and the contractor would have incurred a loss of$47,545. 
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While the RSA still produces a savings of $74,818 for the government it is a dramatic 
decrease from the anticipated savings of $265,727. 
The above examples illustrate the importance of the MTF and contractor monitoring 
and executing the RSA once it is in place. As stated above all previous analysis was 
completed using estimates and assumptions, therefore monitoring becomes a key issue in 
tracking the cost-effectiveness of the agreement. As mentioned in Chapter III there is no 
OASD(HA) standardized method for HSRs to use in monitoring RSAs. The use of current 
information systems, and possibly the development of new information systems is the key to 
developing a good monitoring program for tracking workload and cost estimates, as well as 
changes in CHAMP US claims data as a result of an RSA. 
3. Conclusion 
The findings of our research indicate that the RS is a viable program that can be 
beneficial to both the government and contractor. However, due to the complex nature of 
the MCSCs it is apparent that there needs to be some form of standardized education on the 
concept ofRS and the effects RS has on the bid price, specifically focusing on the monitoring 
ofRSAs once they are in place. The FA W can easily be manipulated by varying the cost and 
workload estimates and assumptions in order to make the agreement seem cost-effective. 
Therefore, monitoring of the agreement once in place to ensure the cost and workload 
estimates are on track and assumptions are holding true is imperative to a truly cost-effective 
RSA. 
Resource sharing exists primarily as a result of the government requirement that 
potential contractor's reduce their bid price by an amount anticipated to be saved through 
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using RSAs. As a result, there is an implied contract between the government and contractor 
to utilize RSAs when they are deemed cost-effective in order to realize the anticipated cost 
savings. While the structure of the current MCSCs require the use ofRSAs to realize these 
up front cost savings future versions of the MCSC are expected to contain little or no 
provisions for RSAs. 
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The focus of this research was to examine and evaluate the current process for 
identifying, evaluating, and utilizing RSAs and how they affect the costs of the MCSC. Our 
research uncovered some potential areas of additional research that were not covered in this 
thesis due to the recent development of the concept ofRS and the lack of current data on 
actual RSAs. The items below may warrant additional research: 
• Conduct an analysis of an actual RSA that has been in place for over a year and 
use the FA W to determine if the agreement was actually cost-effective. 
• Examine how RSAs are being monitored in different MTFs and develop some type 
of standardized method for monitoring RSAs. This would include determining the 
information systems required for monitoring RSAs. 
• Conduct an analysis on how MEPRS is utilized to estimate an MTF' s marginal 
costs for an RSA and then compare the estimates with the actual marginal costs 
associated with the RSA. 
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Guidelines for Resource Sharing Workload Reporting 
The guidelines provided below are intended to provide the 
contractor and MTF personnel with a common basis for determining the 
full impact of resource sharing activities on MTF workload, measured in 
terms of admissions and outpatient visits. The "full credit" workload 
determinations made on the basis of these guidelines are intended to be 
used as a starting point for negotiations between the contractor and the 
MTF concerning the percentage of the full-credit workload which should 
be reported to the Contracting Officer for use in the bid price adjustment 
process described in Section G-5.g(2). In accordance with Section C-
8.f(4)(a) 3, both the full-credit workload and the number of admissions 
and outpatient visits credited to each agreement shall be certified by the 
MTF commander or designee and reported to the Contracting Officer on 
a monthly basis during the health care delivery periods of the contract. 
The key guestion which these guidelines are intended to answer for each 
agreement is this: 
What is the number of admissions and outpatient 
visits, reported by the MTF under MEPRS, which 
would not have been accomplished without resource 
sharing? 
The following definitions apply to the guidelines presented in this document: 
1) Agreement. Unless otherwise specified, refers to a resource sharing 
agreement entered into by the contractor and the MTF Commander. 
2) CHAM PUS Patients. Patients who are eligible for benefits under the 
CHAMPUS program. 
3) Non-CHAMPUS Patients. Patients who are not eligible for benefits 
under the CHAMPUS program. 
4) Personnel. Personnel in general, whether providers or support staff. 
5) Project. A set of associated agreements which combine to provide a 
service or group of services in a given clinical area. For example, an 
operating room project might include separate agreements for 
anesthesiology, OR nurses, and recovery room nurses. 
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6) Providers. Health care personnel who are granted privileges by the MTF 
Commander to provide patient care at the MTF. Examples are 
physicians, nurse anesthetists, podiatrists, psychologists, nurse 
practitioners, social workers, etc. 
7) Workload. In the context of this document, workload generally refers to 
admissions or outpatient visits as recorded by the MTF. 
Guidelines 
1) Only visits and admissions for CHAM PUS-eligible patients performed as 
a direct result of resource sharing agreements will be counted as 
resource sharing workload. Counts will be based on the same definitions 
used by the MTFs for visits and admissions, regardless of how the 
service performed is defined for purposes of CHAM PUS reimbursement. 
The MEPRS Manual provides the relevant definitions of visits and 
admissions. 
Examples: 1) A physician office visit performed by a resource sharing 
provider is counted as a visit. 2) A surgery performed by a resource 
sharing p.ovider is counted as an admission if the patient is admitted for 
that surgical procedure. 3) A mammogram or MRI generally will not be 
counted as a visit, even though it is a service which would be paid for 
underCHAMPUS, because it is not counted as a visit by the MTF. (See 
number 8 below for an exception to this rule.) 4) A telephone consult 
made by a resource sharing provider may be counted as a visit, if it is 
counted as a visit by the MTF, even though it might not be reimbursed 
under CHAMPUS (or as part of a resource sharing agreement). 5) 
"Same day surgeries," where an admission and discharge actually take 
place will be counted as admissions. 6) "Ambulatory surgeries," where 
no admission takes place, will be counted as visits. 7) Procedures, such 
as endoscopies, colonoscopies, and outpatient podiatry procedures 
normally performed in a physician office or clinic setting will be counted 
as visits; however, if for some reason a patient is admitted to have such a 
procedure performed, it may be counted as an admission, if the MTF 
counts it as an admission. 
2) Services performed by resource sharing providers for non-CHAM PUS 
patients will be paid for by the MTF in accordance with the terms of the 
agreement. Workload and costs associated with the provision of services 
to non-CHAMPUS patients will not be credited to the resource sharing 
agreement. 
3) If the MTF has designated resource sharing operating room suites, all 
workload for CHAM PUS-eligible patients performed in those suites will be 
counted as admissions or visits (See Note 2, immediately below), 
according to definitions used by the MTF, and credited as workload to the 
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resource sharing agreement. The same rule applies for any unit or 
activity which is established and maintained as a direct result of resource 
sharing, even if some MTF personnel also participate in the activities of 
the unit. 
Examples: 1) A designated CHAM PUS operating room where 
anesthesia and nursing services are supplied through resource sharing, 
even though OR techs are provided by the MTF and surgeries are 
performed by MTF providers. 2) A pediatric intensive care unit 
established and maintained through resource sharing, even though some 
of the nursing staff is provided by tne MTF. 
Notes: 1) A necessary condition for this guideline to apply is that the unit 
or activity and the associated CHAMPUS workload would not exist in the 
absence of the resource sharing agreement. If this is not the case, then 
the proportional allocation guideline in 5) below applies. 2) In the OR 
example above, admissions and outpatient visits which occur at the MTF 
because of the agreement may be counted even though the workload 
units reported under MEPRS for the operating room itself may not be 
admissions or visits, provided that the admissions or visits reported under 
the agreement are reported under MEPRS somewhere, are not reported 
as resource sharing workload in conjunction with another agreement, and 
would notilave occurred without the agreement. 
4) If resource sharing provides the entire staff for a nursing unit or other 
activity, then all CHAMP US admissions or visits performed as a result of 
that agreement may be counted as resource sharing workload. Services 
by resource sharing personnel performed for non-CHAM PUS patients on 
such a unit will be paid for by the MTF according to the terms and 
conditions of the agreement, and the costs associated with that care will 
not be counted as health care costs under the contract. 
Example: A nursing unit staffed entirely by resource sharing personnel. 
All CHAMP US patients would be counted as admissions (unless the 
admission was counted under another agreement). Costs associated 
with services to non-CHAM PUS patients, if any, would be reimbursed by 
the MTF. All resource sharing costs, except those reimbursed by the 
MTF for non-CHAM PUS patients, would be allowed as health care costs 
under the contract. 
5) When resource sharing personnel staff only a portion of a nursing unit or 
other activity in which MTF and resource sharing personnel work as part 
of a patient care team providing care to all classes of patients on the unit, 
workload performed on the unit will be credited to the resource sharing 
agreement in proportion to the relative contribution of resource sharing 
personnel to the production of the workload on that unit. This generally 
be done in proportion to the percentage of staff provided to the unit 
through resource sharing, except that the number of units of workload so 
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calculated may not exceed the actual number of units provided for 
CHAM PUS patients on the unit. 
Example: Suppose there are 100 admissions to a nursing unit in a given 
month, 60 of which are CHAMP US patients and that 50% of the staffing 
of the unit is provided through a resource sharing agreement. Then 50 of 
the admissions may be counted as resource sharing admissions, and all 
costs associated with the agreement may be counted as health care 
costs. 
Note: In applying this guideline, it may be necessary to specify in the 
agreement on what basis the proportional counting will take place. For 
example, in the above illustration, the resource sharing agreement may 
supply 75% of the RNs, 30% of the ward clerks and 25% of the LVNs, for 
a total of 50% of the ward's personnel, and these may be distributed 
differently on different shifts and on different days. Although the average 
coverage may be 50% of the staffing of the unit, it may be that the 
number of CHAM PUS patients that can be cared for is dependent 
primarily on the number of RNs present. In such a situation, the 
proportion used fo.r allocating CHAMPUS admissions to the unit may be 
weighted more toward the proportion of RN coverage, if this is specified 
in the agreement. The guiding principle should be how the various types 
of resources supplied affect the volume of CHAM PUS workload. In no 
case may percentages of different classes of personnel be added 
together to achieve a result (e.g., 20% of the LVNs and 30% of the RNs 
would not allow the contractor to take credit for 50% of the workload on 
the unit, unless this actually represented 50% of the staff of the unit). 
6) In the case of a resource sharing agreement in which equipment is the 
only resource provided, the terms of the agreement, as they pertain to 
counting of workload, must be approved by the Lead Agent in advance. 
If the equipment is clearly the primary enabling factor in producing the 
workload, then CHAMPUS visits and admissions performed using that 
equipment may be credited to the agreement. Care may be provided to 
non-CHAM PUS patients with the equipment without compensation by the 
MTF, as long as so doing does not affect the volume of services provided 
to CHAM PUS patients or otherwise result in increased costs to the 
contractor; however, an agreement may specify circumstanc~s under 
which MTF reimbursement for use of the equipment for the care of non-
CHAM PUS patients will be required. All contractor costs associated with 
equipment-only agreements may be counted as health care costs under 
the contract, except those which are paid by the MTF for care provided to 
non-CHAMPUS patients. 
Examples: 1) A laparoscope supplied to increase the capability of the 
MTF to perform surgeries for CHAM PUS patients. 2) A laser to allow 
more ophthalmologic procedures to be performed. 3) A treadmill to allow 
more cardiology patients to be seen. 
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Notes: 1) An equipment-only agreement for a piece of durable 
equipment should have a specified term, and may specify a proportional 
rule for counting workload as agreed upon by the contractor and the MTF 
in consideration of the value of the equipment and its relative contribution 
to the production of workload. (For example, all surgeries performed with 
a resource sharing laparoscope might be counted as resource sharing 
workload for a period of one year, or one visit may be counted for every 
two visits conducted using a particular piece of equipment.) The intent 
here is to avoid a situation where, for a relatively small, one-time 
investment, the contractor may be credited with a large volume of 
workload for the duration of the contract. 2) Lead Agent approval is not 
required in the case of significant patient devices, such as artificial joints 
or pacemakers, agreements for which may be credited with the MTF 
workload unit applicable to the service enabled by the device. 
7) When multiple resource sharing agreements are involved in the provision 
of services to the same patient for a single visit or admission, only one 
visit or admission will be counted as resource sharing workload. The 
MTF and the contractor involved must agree on procedures and internal 
controls to ensure that no multiple counting of resource sharing workload 
occurs. 
8) As a genEMal rule, resource sharing agreements should relate directly to 
admissions and visits which take place in the patient care work center to 
which the resources are supplied; however, this does not preclude 
agreements which include support services outside of that work center, 
such as an additional laboratory tech to support increased CHAMPUS 
workload at a clinic supported by resource sharing. Under such 
circumstances, workload shall be reported based on the impact of the 
resources supplied directly to the patient care work center, with no 
additional workload credited to the support functions. However, with the 
permission of the Lead Agent, agreements may be established which 
credit admissions or visits to a support service agreement based on the 
impact that agreement has on a patient care work center, if it can be 
clearly demonstrated that a resource sharing agreement is responsible 
for enabling a CHAMPUS visit or admission at the MTF (i.e., in the 
absence of the agreement, the visit or admission would not have 
occurred). 
Examples: 1) An echo-cardiogram tech is supplied to a radiology 
department to allow more cardiology visits to take place. Cardiology 
visits for CHAM PUS-eligible patients enabled by this agreement may be 
counted as visits although the echo-cardiogram itself would not be 
counted as a visit by the MTF. 2) An MRI tech is provided through 
resource sharing to allow an orthopedic clinic to provide more visits for 
CHAMPUS-eligible patients. 
Notes: 1) In all such situations the increased CHAM PUS workload 
attributable to the agreement may be credited to the agreement provided 
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that the admissions or visits would not otherwise have occurred, that they 
are not being counted in association with another resource sharing 
agreement, that the workload relationship and method of counting are 
specified in the agreement, and that the agreement has been approved 
by the Contracting Officer. All associated resource sharing costs may 
also be counted as health care costs, except those which are paid by the 
MTF for services to non-CHAM PUS patients in accordance with the 
terms of the agreement. 2) The current CHAMP US Cooperative Care 
policy must be considered in applying this guideline, since, under it, a 
wide range of diagnostic CHAM PUS services may be provided under 
CHAM PUS, if the services are not available at the MTF, without 
disengaging the patient. Thus it is less likely that a valid argument can 
be made that the availability of a particular support service at the MTF is 
crucial to providing a particular type of visit at the MTF. 
9) No workload will be credited to a resource sharing agreement solely on 
the basis of supplies provided. In general supplies will be considered as 
resources provided in support of a particular agreement involving 
personnel, or equipment, or both. , Exceptions to this rule must be 
authorized by the Lead Agent. 
Examples: 1) In an operating room supported by resource sharing 
personnel- and supplies, workload will be credited based on the personnel 
assets provided; the supplies and associated costs will be considered to 
be in support of the workload performed by the personnel provided. 2) In 
a clinic staffed by a resource sharing provider, if the agreement covers 
the costs of prescription drugs prescribed by the provider, the drugs and 
costs associated with them will be considered in support of the provider 
agreement. 
Note: This guideline does not apply to agreements for the provision of 
significant patient devices, such as artificial joints or pacemakers (see 
Note 2 under Guideline 6). 
1 0) If the contractor and the MTF Commander agree that it is appropriate to 
do so, a proportional counting approach (providing less than one-to-one 
credit in terms of resource sharing workload, as indicated in Note 1 under 
Guideline 6 above) may be used in non-equipment agreements to avoid a 
disproportionate workload credit for a relatively minor resource sharing 
contribution; however, prior approval of the Lead Agent is required. 
Note: Given that the workload credit reported for purposes of the bid price 
adjustment will be subject to negotiations in accordance with Section G-
5.g(2), situations in which this guideline need be applied should be rare. 
11) In conjunction with the foregoing guidelines, there must be a monthly 
certification of the impact of resource sharing workload on MTF workload, 
jointly prepared by the MTF and the contractor. Disputes will be resolved 
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by the Contracting Officer or a designated representative. The 
certification will summarize the number of admissions and visits credited 
to each individual project or agreement and the total number of 
admissions and visits enabled by resource sharing at the MTF during the 
month. Visits and admissions must be categorized by beneficiary type 
(i.e., ADD vs. NADD). These are the categories currently specified in the 
bid price adjustment process. Prenatal and postnatal 08 visits must also 
be separately accounted for. (See attached format.) These jointly 
prepared and certified reports will form the basis for the resource sharing 
workload counts reported in the contractor's monthly resource sharing 
report and used in the bid price adjustment process. Each monthly report 
must be signed by designated MTF and contractor representatives. 
Cost Accounting Note: Except where otherwise indicated above, all contractor health 
care costs associated with resource sharing workload reported in accordance with the 
above guidelines may be counted as health care costs under the contract. 
Implementation Note: Full implementation of these guidelines will require specification 
in each agreement of the method of counting to be used. Given the complex nature of 
health care and the variety of settings in which it is provided, it is likely that not all 
present and future agreements are adequately addressed in the guidelines as written. If 
assistance in applying these guidelines is needed, the Contracting Officer's 
Representative (or the AAemate Contracting Officer's Representative for the appropriate 
Lead Agent Region) should be contacted. He or she will provide guidance or request 
further direction from the Contracting Officer. 
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Format for Monthly Certification 
of Impact of Resource Sharing 
on MTF Workload 
MTF __________________ _ Month of Report--------
Project /Agreement Admissions 08 Visits* Other Visits** 
ADD NADD ADD NADD ADD NADD 
Totals: 
* Pre-natal and post-natal obstetric outpatient visits assumed to be related to 
delivery. These visits are excluded from the resource sharing workload data because 
they are already included in the MTF OB visits which are deducted from total MTF visits 
in the bid price adjustment process. 
** Only outpatient visits as defined in the MEPRS Manual. Inpatient visits shall 
not be reported. 
93 
94 
APPENDIX B. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS WORKSHEET (FAW) 
95 
A I B I c 
1 MTF/CONTRACTOR INPUTS TO RESOURCE SHARING FINANCIAL WORKSHEET 
~ REGION DELTA 
7 
7 BOXED VALUES MUST BE ENTERED FIRST 
'5 ~ VARIABLE VALUE 
r-t 
- Note: For All Variables, If Proposed Change Will Be Limited To One Setting (Inpatient or 
~ Outpatient), Enter Zeroes for the Other Setting. 9 
r-w 1. Option Period II 1 
~ rn- 2. Expected Contractor Category 8 Expenditure Under This Resource Sharing Agreement 
~ 
~ A. Total Contractor Category 8 Expenditure for CHAMP US and Non-CHAMPUS Eligibles 1r $226,682 
Ts 
1s B. Contractor Category 8 Expenditure for Non-CHAMPUS Eligibles, If Any II $0 
17 
1s C. Contractor Category 8 Expenditure for CHAMPUS Eligibles Only (Used in Worksheet) $226,682 
19 
~ ~ 3. 
Projected MTF Marginal Expenditures Under RS Agreement 
~ A. Total MTF Marginal Expenditures for Both CHAMPUS and Non-CHAMPUS Eligibles II $67,609 
T3 
"24 B. MTF Marginal Expenditures for Non-CHAM PUS Eligibles, If Any ll $0 
"25 
26 C. MTF Marginal Expenditures for CHAMP US Eligibles Only (Used in Worksheet) $67,609 
2f 
2s 4. Contractor Resource Sharing Workload Credit Assumed in Analysis (May Need to Be I[ 100% 
29 Adjusted on an Iterative Basis Until Worksheet is Finalized) 
To 
31 5. Number of MTF Units Enabled By the Resource Sharing Agreement in Option Period 
32 (Should Reflect the Number of MTF Units Which Would Not Occur in the Absence of 
rat the RS Agreement) ~ 
'35 A. MTF Units for Both CHAM PUS and Non-CHAM PUS Eligibles 
'36 
'37 Inpatient Admissions AD~II 0 t-aB NADD 0 
~ 
7o Outpatient Visits AD~II 3,186 71 NADD 3,186 
72 
"43 B. MTF Units for Non-CHAMP US Eligibles, If Any 
""« 
~ Inpatient Admissions AD~II 0 Ts NADD 0 
~ 
7s Outpatient Visits AD~II 0 
'49 NADD 0 
'5o 
'51 c. MTF Units for CHAMPUS Eligibles Only (Used in Worksheet) 
1-52 
1-53 Inpatient Admissions ADD 0 
1-54 NADD 0 
r-ss 
~ Outpatient Visits ADD 3,186 
tsf NADD 3,186 
96 
B c 
Expected Government Risk Sharing Responsibility % 80% 
Expected Contractor Risk Sharing Responsibility% (100%- Government%) 20% 
Assumed Volume Trade-Off Factor for Workload Expected Under This Agreement 
Note: This is Used to Estimate CHAMPUS Avoidance. The VTF's Cannot Be Lower than 1.0. 
While the VTF Under Resource Sharing is Expected to Be Lower than the VTF for MTF Care 
Overall, the Following Official DoD VTF Estimates for MTF Care Overall May Be Helpful in 
Estimating These Inputs: 
Inpatient, < Age 65 
Outpatient, < Age 65 





Inpatient Admissions Relevant to Proposed Agreement 





Average Government Cost Per Unit Avoided in CHAMPUS For Care Covered By Agreement 
You Can Either Estimate Average Government Costs in the Worksheet (A) or Use Estimates 
Developed Elsewhere (B). Enter Zeroes in the Boxes for the Method (A or B) Not Used. 
A. Estimating Average Government Costs in Worksheet 
1. Total Government CHAMPUS Costs for Workload Affected 
Inpatient Admissions 
Outpatient Visits 
2. Total CHAMPUS Units for Workload Affected 
Inpatient Admissions 
Outpatient Visits 
B. Average Government Costs Provided From Other Source 
Per Inpatient Admission 
Per Outpatient Visit 

























A B F G 
(Reflects Apri11, 1996 start date for health care delivery) 
REGIONAL VARIABLE 
Assumed Gross Savings:Cost Ratio 
Used to Develop Resource 
Sharing Savings Trend Factor 





[(M X p X Q) + (M X R X S) + 
(M x T xU)] for Cat. 4-7 Total 
ADD 
NADD 
NAS% of DCP Inpatient Costs 
ADD' 
NADD 
Number of NAS-Equivalents Without 
the Resource Sharing Agreement 
ADD 
NAD 
Volume Trade-Off Factor Assumed 
In Contract For Outpatient Visits 
(Used to Calculate "0" Factor) 
Number of MTF Outpatient Visits 
(Non-08, Non-Partnership) Without 









OPTION 1 OPTION 2 OPTION 3 OPTION4 OPTION 5 
2.20 2.20 2.20 2.20 2.20 
68,573 65,902 64,210 63,864 63,845 
137,914 137,046 136,582 136,421 136,409 
$258.53 $257.36 $263.65 $272.50 $282.64 
$194.48 $190.77 $193.70 $199.09 $205.98 
0.74 $223.36 $233.67 $246.73 $261.49 
1.89 $289.25 $297.89 $310.37 $325.42 
3,143 3,016 2,877 2,862 2,861 
4,622 4,554 4,501 4,496 4,496 
ADD 339,214 237,505 225,154 224,832 223,931 223,846 
NADD~===6=5=0=,M==9=====4=08:·:95=5======39:8=,4=1=8=====4=1:0:,5=13======4=1=4,=0=29======4=14=·=24~9 
Proposed Profit Rate for 
Overall Health Care Costs 
Contractor's Aggregate Resource 
58 Sharing Expenditures Assumed in BAFO 
3.50% 3.53% 3.56% 3.57% 3.58% 






A I B I c I D I E I 
DETERMINING WHETHER THE PROPOSED RESOURCE SHARING EXPENDITURES ARE 
ALREADY INCLUDED IN THE CONTRACTOR'S AGGREGATE BAFO SPENDING ASSUMPTION 
REGION DELTA 
OPTION 1 OPTION 2 OPTION 3 OPTION4 
F 
OPTION 5 
Contractor's Aggregate Resource $12,855,323 $12,446,990 $13,162,671 $13,999,121 $14,854,106 
Sharing Expenditures Assumed in BAFO 
Sum of Projected Resource Sharing 
Expenditures for Agreements Already 
Approved--To Be Supplied by Lead Agent 
Is Proposed Resource Sharing 
Agreement Already Included in 





$0 $0 $0 
YES YES YES 











B 1 c~--' o 
RESOURCE SHARING FINANCIAL ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
REGION DELTA 
Assumed Resource Savings Already Reflected in Proposed Bid Price Assumptions 
Expected Contractor Category 8 Expenditures for CHAMPUS Eligibles Under This Resource Sharing Agreement 
Are Proposed Savings Already Included in Contractor's BAFO? 
Assumed Savings:Cost Ratio Used to Develop Resource Sharing Savings Trend Factor 
in Original Bid Price for Categories 1-7 
Expected Savings in Cat. 1-7 for this Agreement, Consistent with Proposed Savings Trend Factor 
and Assumed To Be Already Reflected in Original Bid Price for Categories 1-7 
Net CHAMPUS Savings Assumed To Be Already Reflected in Contractor's BAFO 







A 8 I c I D I E 
23111. Impact of Cat. 1-7 Bid Price Adjustment for 0 Factor 
Note: 0 Factor calculations must be beneficiary-category specific. 
ADD NADD Total 
A. Bid Price Components Unaffected by RS Agreement: 
1. Number of CHAMPUS Eligibles in DCP (for the Region) 78,660 140,490 NA 
2. Number of CHAM PUS Eligibles in Option Period (for the Region) 68,573 137,914 NA 
3. [(M x P x Q) + (M x R x S) + (M x T xU)) for Categories 1-3 Total in Option Period (for the Region) $259 $194 NA 
4. [(M x P x Q) + (M x R x S) + (M x T x U)] for Categories 4-7 Total in Option Period (for the Region) $221 $292 NA 
B. Inpatient Resource Sharing Agreements: Calculation of 0 Factor Impact 
1. NAS % of DCP Inpatient Costs (Input for 0 Factor Formula, for the Region) 52% 27% NA 
2. Number of NAS-Equivalents in DCP (Input for 0 Factor Formula, for the Region) 4,812 3,681 NA 
-0 
-
fAA I 3. Number of NAS-Equivalents without the Resource Sharing Agreement in Option Period 3,143 4,622 NA 
(Input for 0 Factor Formula, for the Region) 
4. Inpatient 0 Factor without this Resource Sharing Agreement in Option Period 0.869603544 1.075354362 NA 
5. Number of MTF Admissions of CHAMPUS Eligibles Enabled by the Resource Sharing Agreement in Opti 0 0 NA 
Period (Should Reflect the Number of MTF Admissions Which Would Not Occur in the Absence of the 
Resource Sharing Agreement, According to the Resource Sharing Workload Reporting Guidelines 
Provided in Section J, Attachment 13) 
6. Number of NAS-Equivalents with the Resource Sharing Agreement in Option Period, Before 3,143 4,622 NA 
Contractor Workload Credit 
7. Contractor's Workload Credit for the Resource Sharing Agreement in Option Period 100% 100% NA 
(Pending Confirmation of Acceptable Worksheet Results) 
8. Number of NAS-Equivalents Credited to Resource Sharing Agreement in Option Period 0 0 NA 
9. Number of NAS-Equivalents with the RS Agreement in Option Period, After Contractor Workload Credit 3,143 4,622 NA 
10. Inpatient 0 Factor with this Resource Sharing Agreement in Option Period 0.869603544 1.075354362 NA 
A B c D E 
c. Outpatient Resource Sharing Agreements: Calculation of 0 Factor Impact 
1. CHAMPUS Outpatient Visits in the DCP (Input for 0 Factor Formula, for the Region) 222.499 415,332 NA 
2. MTF Outpatient Visits in DCP (Input for 0 Factor Formula, for the Region) 339,214 650,449 NA 
3. Number of MTF Outpatient Visits without the Resource Sharing Agreement in Option Period 237,505 408,955 NA 
(Input for 0 Factor Formula, for the Region) 
4. Volume Trade-Off Factor for Outpatient Visits Assumed in Contract 1.8 2.8 
5. Outpatient 0 Factor without this Resource Sharing Agreement in Option Period 1.166723147 1.201091634 NA 
6. Number of MTF Outpatient Visits By CHAMP US Eligibles Enabled by the Resource Sharing Agreement in 3,186 3,186 NA 
Option Period (Should Reflect the Number of MTF Outpatient Visits Which Would Not Occur in the Absence 
of the Resource Sharing Agreement, According to the Resource Sharing Workload Reporting Guidelines 
Provided in Section J, Attachment 13) 
7. Number of MTF Outpatient Visits with the Resource Sharing Agreement in Option Period, Before 240,691 412,141 NA 
Contractor Workload Credit 
...... BE 0 8. Contractor's Workload Credit for the Resource Sharing Agreement in Option Period 100% 100% NA 7 N (Pending Confirmation of Acceptable Worksheet Results) 
9. Number of MTF Outpatient Visits Credited to Resource Sharing Agreement in Option Period 3,186 3,186 NA 
10. Number of MTF Outpatient Visits with the RS Agreement in Option Period, After Workload Credit 237,505 408,955 NA 
11. Outpatient 0 Factor with this Resource Sharing Agreement in Option Period 1.166723147 1.201091634 NA 
D. Decrease in Cat. 1-7 Bid Price due to 0 Factor Adjustment, If Any 
1. Inpatient CHAMPUS Costs (Categories 1 to 3) $0 $0 $0 
2. Outpatient CHAMPUS Costs (Categories 4 to 7) $0 $0 $0 




















Impact on Actual Cat. 1-7 CHAMPUS Claims Costs 
Impact on Inpatient CHAMPUS Claims Costs 
Number of MTF Admissions of CHAMPUS Eligibles Enabled by the Resource Sharing Agreement in Opti 
Period (Should Reflect the Number of MTF Admissions Which Would Not Occur in the Absence of the 
Resource Sharing Agreement, According to the Resource Sharing Workload Reporting Guidelines 
Provided in Section J, Attachment 13) 
Assumed VTF for Inpatient Resource Sharing Workload Expected Under this Agreement 
Number of Admissions Avoided in CHAMP US 
Average Government Cost Per Unit for Admissions Avoided in CHAMPUS 
Estimated Categories 1-3 Inpatient CHAMPUS Costs Avoided with Resource Sharing Agreement 
Impact on Outpatient CHAM PUS Claims Costs 
Number of MTF Outpatient Visits By CHAM PUS Eligibles Enabled by the Resource Sharing Agreement in 
Option Period (Should Reflect the Number of MTF Outpatient Visits Which Would Not Occur in the Absence 
of the Resource Sharing Agreement, According to the Resource Sharing Workload Reporting Guidelines 
Provided in Section J, Attachment 13) 
Assumed VTF for Outpatient Resource Sharing Workload Expected Under this Agreement 
Number of Outpatient Visits Avoided in CHAM PUS 
Average Government Cost Per Unit for Outpatient Visits Avoided in CHAM PUS 
Estimated Categories 4-7 Outpatient CHAMPUS Costs Avoided with Resource Sharing Agreement 
Estimated Categories 1-7 CHAMPUS Costs Avoided with Resource Sharing Agreement 
c D E 
ADD NADD Total 
0 0 NA 
1.0 1.0 NA 
0 0 NA 
$0 $0 NAI 
$0 $0 $0 
ADD NADD Total 
3,186 3,186 NA 
1.2 1.2 NA 
2,655 2,655 NA 
$124 $124 NA 
$328,609 $328,609 $657,219 













Risk Sharing Impact 
Contractor's Resource Sharing Expenditures in Category 8 (For CHAMPUS Eligibles Only) 
Net Decrease in Actual CHAMPUS Costs (Categories 1-7 Costs Avoided Minus Category 8 Costs) 
Net Decrease in CHAM PUS Costs Already Reflected in Contractor's Total Bid Price 
(Includes Effect of Assumed Resource Sharing Expenditures and Savings Trend Factor from BAFO) 
Decrease in Categories 1-7 Bid Price due to 0 Factor Adjustment, If Any 
Residual Gain in CHAMPUS Categories 1-7 Costs To Be Shared 
(Actual Net Decrease in Health Care Costs - Savings in BAFO Price - 0 Factor Adjustment) 
Expected Government Risk Sharing Responsibility Percentage 
(Lead Agent To Provide Guidance with Input from Contractor 
for This Assumption to Ensure Consistency within the Region) 
Expected Contractor Risk Sharing Responsibility Percentage 
(Lead Agent To Provide Guidance with Input from Contractor 
for This Assumption to Ensure Consistency within the Region) 
Resulting Government Gain Sharing Amount 
Resulting Contractor Gain Sharing Amount 































8 C E 
RESULTS OF ANALYSIS: CHECK OF CONTRACTOR WORKLOAD CREDIT AND MHSS COST-EFFECTIVENESS 
Contractor Resource Sharing Workload Credit Assumed in Analysis (Above) 
Contractor's Resource Sharing Expenditures as Percent of Total Expenditures (Contractor+ MTF Marginal) 
(For Information; Not Used in Worksheet Calculations) 
Analysis of Contractor Profit and Workload Credit: 
Contractor's Resource Sharing Expenditures 
Are These Expenditures and the Resulting Savings Already Reflected in the Contractor's BAFO? 
Projected Actual Net Contractor Gain from Resource Sharing (Risk Sharing Result): 
For Comparison In Judging Reasonable Workload Credit, vs. Profit Rate on Expenditures Only 
See Also Comparison of Contractor vs. Government Gains Under RS Agreement (Below) 
Projected Actual Contractor Resource Sharing Profit as Percent of Resource Sharing Expenditures 








Is Proposed Contractor Workload Credit Appropriate? 
For Agreements Reflecting Expenditures and Resulting Savings Already Included in the Contractor's BAFO (See Part V.C.1), 
100 Percent Workload Credit is Appropriate If the MHSS Cost-Effectiveness Requirement Is Also Satisfied. For Agreements 
Reflecting Expenditures and Resulting Savings Beyond Those Assumed in the Contractor's BAFO, the Projected Actual 
Contractor Profit Rate for Resource Sharing (See Part V.C.3) Should Be Approximately Equal to the Proposed Profit Rate 
for Overall Health Care Costs (Rounding to the Nearest Full Percentage Point) (See Part V.C.4) 
YES 
(See Explanation at Left) 
Analysis of Cost-Effectiveness for the Government from the MHSS Perspective 
Projected MTF Expenditures Under RS Agreement (For CHAMPUS Eligibles Only) 
Projected Government Gain in CHAMPUS Under RS Agreement (Net Savings in BAFO Price + 
Savings from 0 Factor Adjustment +Government Share of Residual CHAMPUS Gain) 
Net Government MHSS Savings Under RS Agreement 
Do Government Gains Exceed Government Expenditures? 
If the Result in Part V.D.3 Is a Positive Value, Then Government Gains Exceed Government Costs 
Bottom Line Comparison of Projected Contractor and Government Gains Under RS Agreement 
Total Projected Net Contractor Gain Under Resource Sharing Agreement 
Total Projected Net Government Gain Under Resource Sharing Agreement 
NOTE: TERMS OF PROPOSED AGREEMENT SHOULD ONLY BE APPROVED IF THE RESPONSES TO PART V.C.S AND V.D.4 ARE BOTH "YES." 
IF THE RESPONSES TO BOTH QUESTIONS (PARTS V.C.S AND V.D.4) ARE NOT ''YES," THEN THE PROPOSED CONTRACTOR WORKLOAD 
CREDIT SHOULD BE ADJUSTED ON AN ITERATIVE BASIS UNTIL THE PROPOSED AGREEMENT SATISFIES BOTH REQUIREMENTS. 
IF THIS IS NOT POSSIBLE, GIVEN ALL OF THE OTHER INPUT ASSUMPTIONS AGREED UPON BY THE MTF COMMANDER AND THE CONTRACTOR, 
THEN THE PROPOSED RESOURCE SHARING AGREEMENT SHOULD NOT BE APPROVED (UNLESS THE LEAD AGENT DETERMINES THAT THE 








APPENDIX C. FAW FOR COST A VOIDANCE RSA 
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-1 
A I 8 I C I D I E 
DETERMINING WHETHER THE PROPOSED RESOURCE SHARING EXPENDITURES ARE 
ALREADY INCLUDED IN THE CONTRACTOR'S AGGREGATE BAFO SPENDING ASSUMPTION 
REGION ALPHA 
OPTION 1 OPTION 2 OPTION 3 OPTION 4 
F 
OPTION 5 
Contractor's Aggregate Resource $12,855,323 $12,446,990 $13,162,671 $13,999,121 $14,854,106 
10 I Sharing Expenditures Assumed in BAFO 
11 
12 
Sum of Projected Resource Sharing !!J Expenditures for Agreements Already 
~Approved--To Be Supplied by Lead Agent 
16 
$250,000 $0 $0 $0 $0 
~ I 18 rs Proposed Resource Sharing 
19 Agreement Already Included in 
20 the Contractor's Aggregate BAFO 
21 Spending Assumptions? 












B I c I D 
RESOURCE SHARING FINANCIAL ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
REGION ALPHA 
Assumed Resource Savings Already Reflected in Proposed Bid Price Assumptions 
Expected Contractor Category 8 Expenditures for CHAM PUS Eligibles Under This Resource Sharing Agreement 
Are Proposed Savings Already Included in Contractor's BAFO? 
Assumed Savings:Cost Ratio Used to Develop Resource Sharing Savings Trend Factor 
in Original Bid Price for Categories 1-7 
Expected Savings in Cat. 1-7 for this Agreement, Consistent with Proposed Savings Trend Factor 
and Assumed To Be Already Reflected in Original Bid Price for Categories 1-7 
Net CHAMPUS Savings Assumed To Be Already Reflected in Contractor's BAFO 







A B c D E 
23111. Impact of Cat. 1-7 Bid Price Adjustment for 0 Factor 
Note: 0 Factor calculations must be beneficiary-category specific. 
ADD NADD Total 
A. Bid Price Components Unaffected by RS Agreement: 
1. Number of CHAM PUS Eligibles in DCP (for the Region} 78,660 140,490 NA 
2. Number of CHAM PUS Eligibles in Option Period (for the Region} 68,573 137,914 NA 
3. [(M x P x Q} + (M x R x S} + (M x T x U}) for Categories 1-3 Total in Option Period (for the Region} $259 $194 NA 
4. [(M x P x Q} + (M x R x S} + (M x T xU}] for Categories 4-7 Total in Option Period (for the Region} $221 $292 NA 
B. Inpatient Resource Sharing Agreements: Calculation of 0 Factor Impact 
1. NAS % of DCP Inpatient Costs (Input for 0 Factor Formula, for the Region} 52% 27% NA 
2. Number of NAS-Equivalents in DCP (Input for 0 Factor Formula, for the Region} 4,812 3,681 NA ,_. 
,_. 
0 1441 3. Number of NAS-Equivalents without the Resource Sharing Agreement in Option Period 3,143 4,622 NA (Input for 0 Factor Formula, for the Region} 
4. Inpatient 0 Factor without this Resource Sharing Agreement in Option Period 0.869603544 1.075354362 NA 
5. Number of MTF Admissions of CHAM PUS Eligibles Enabled by the Resource Sharing Agreement in Opti 0 0 NA Period (Should Reflect the Number of MTF Admissions Which Would Not Occur in the Absence of the 
Resource Sharing Agreement, According to the Resource Sharing Workload Reporting Guidelines 
Provided in Section J, Attachment 13} 
6. Number of NAS-Equivalents with the Resource Sharing Agreement in Option Period, Before 3,143 4,622 NA Contractor Workload Credit 
7. Contractor's Workload Credit for the Resource Sharing Agreement in Option Period 100% 100% NA (Pending Confirmation of Acceptable Worksheet Results} 
8. Number of NAS-Equivalents Credited to Resource Sharing Agreement in Option Period 0 0 NA 
9. Number of NAS-Equivalents with the RS Agreement in Option Period, After Contractor Workload Credit 3,143 4,622 NA 
10. Inpatient 0 Factor with this Resource Sharing Agreement in Option Period 0.869603544 1.075354362 NA 
A B c D E 
c. Outpatient Resource Sharing Agreements: Calculation of 0 Factor Impact 
1. CHAMPUS Outpatient Visits in the DCP (Input for 0 Factor Formula, for the Region) 222,499 415,332 NA 
2. MTF Outpatient Visits in DCP (Input for 0 Factor Formula, for the Region) 339,214 650,449 NA 
3. Number of MTF Outpatient Visits without the Resource Sharing Agreement in Option Period 237,505 408,955 NA 
(Input for 0 Factor Formula, for the Region) 
4. Volume Trade-Off Factor for Outpatient Visits Assumed in Contract 1.8 2.8 
5. Outpatient 0 Factor without this Resource Sharing Agreement in Option Period 1.166723147 1.201091634 NA 
6. Number of MTF Outpatient Visits By CHAM PUS Eligibles Enabled by the Resource Sharing Agreement in 439 695 NA 
Option Period (Should Reflect the Number of MTF Outpatient Visits Which Would Not Occur in the Absence 
of the Resource Sharing Agreement, According to the Resource Sharing Workload Reporting Guidelines 
Provided in Section J, Attachment 13) 
7. Number of MTF Outpatient Visits with the Resource Sharing Agreement in Option Period, Before 237,944 409,650 NA 
Contractor Workload Credit 
,_. 00 ,_. 8. Contractor's Workload Credit for the Resource Sharing Agreement in Option Period 100% 100% NA ,_. 7 (Pending Confirmation of Acceptable Worksheet Results) 
9. Number of MTF Outpatient Visits Credited to Resource Sharing Agreement in Option Period 439 695 NA 
10. Number of MTF Outpatient Visits with the RS Agreement in Option Period, After Workload Credit 237,505 408,955 NA 
11. Outpatient 0 Factor with this Resource Sharing Agreement in Option Period 1.166723147 1.201091634 NA 
D. Decrease in Cat. 1-7 Bid Price due to 0 Factor Adjustment, If Any 
1. Inpatient CHAMPUS Costs (Categories 1 to 3) $0 $0 $0 
2. Outpatient CHAMPUS Costs (Categories 4 to 7) $0 $0 $0 
3. Total Change (Categories 1 to 7) $0 $0 $0 
A 8 c D E 
105 Ill. Impact on Actual Cat. 1-7 CHAMPUS Claims Costs 
A. Impact on Inpatient CHAMPUS Claims Costs ADD NADD Total 
1. Number of MTF Admissions of CHAM PUS Eligibles Enabled by the Resource Sharing Agreement in Opti 0 0 NA 
Period (Should Reflect the Number of MTF Admissions Which Would Not Occur in the Absence of the 
Resource Sharing Agreement, According to the Resource Sharing Workload Reporting Guidelines 
Provided in Section J, Attachment 13) 
2. Assumed VTF for Inpatient Resource Sharing Workload Expected Under this Agreement 1.0 1.0 NA 
3. Number of Admissions Avoided in CHAMPUS 0 0 NA 
4. Average Government Cost Per Unit for Admissions Avoided in CHAM PUS $0 $0 NA 
5. Estimated Categories 1-3 Inpatient CHAMPUS Costs Avoided with Resource Sharing Agreement $0 $0 $0 
B. Impact on Outpatient CHAMP US Claims Costs ADD NADD Total 
-
-tv 1. Number of MTF Outpatient Visits By CHAMPUS Eligibles Enabled by the Resource Sharing Agreement in 439 695 NA 
Option Period (Should Reflect the Number of MTF Outpatient Visits Which Would Not Occur in the Absence 
of the Resource Sharing Agreement, According to the Resource Sharing Workload Reporting Guidelines 
Provided in Section J, Attachment 13) 
2. Assumed VTF for Outpatient Resource Sharing Workload Expected Under this Agreement 1.2 1.2 NA 
3. Number of Outpatient Visits Avoided in CHAMPUS 366 579 NA 
4. Average Government Cost Per Unit for Outpatient Visits Avoided in CHAMPUS $285 $285 NA 
5. Estimated Categories 4-7 Outpatient CHAMPUS Costs Avoided with Resource Sharing Agreement $104,263 $165,063 $269,325 

















Risk Sharing Impact 
Contractor's Resource Sharing Expenditures in Category 8 (For CHAM PUS Eligibles Only) 
Net Decrease in Actual CHAMPUS Costs (Categories 1-7 Costs Avoided Minus Category 8 Costs) 
Net Decrease in CHAMPUS Costs Already Reflected in Contractor's Total Bid Price 
(Includes Effect of Assumed Resource Sharing Expenditures and Savings Trend Factor from BAFO) 
Decrease in Categories 1-7 Bid Price due to 0 Factor Adjustment, If Any 
Residual Gain in CHAMPUS Categories 1-7 Costs To Be Shared 
(Actual Net Decrease in Health Care Costs - Savings in BAFO Price - 0 Factor Adjustment) 
Expected Government Risk Sharing Responsibility Percentage 
(lead Agent To Provide Guidance with Input from Contractor 
for This Assumption to Ensure Consistency within the Region) 
Expected Contractor Risk Sharing Responsibility Percentage 
(Lead Agent To Provide Guidance with Input from Contractor 
for This Assumption to Ensure Consistency within the Region) 
Resulting Government Gain Sharing Amount 
Resulting Contractor Gain Sharing Amount 































I B I c I D I E 
RESULTS OF ANALYSIS: CHECK OF CONTRACTOR WORKLOAD CREDIT AND MHSS COST-EFFECTIVENESS 
Contractor Resource Sharing Workload Credit Assumed in Analysis (Above) 
Contracto~s Resource Sharing Expenditures as Percent of Total Expenditures (Contractor+ MTF Marginal) 
(For Information; Not Used in Worksheet Calculations) 
Analysis of Contractor Profit and Workload Credit: 
Contracto~s Resource Sharing Expenditures 
Are These Expenditures and the Resulting Savings Already Reflected in the Contracto~s BAFO? 
Projected Actual Net Contractor Gain from Resource Sharing (Risk Sharing Result): 
For Comparison in Judging Reasonable Workload Credit, vs. Profit Rate on Expenditures Only 
See Also Comparison of Contractor vs. Government Gains Under RS Agreement (Below) 
Projected Actual Contractor Resource Sharing Profit as Percent of Resource Sharing Expenditures 








Is Proposed Contractor Workload Credit Appropriate? 
For Agreements Reflecting Expenditures and Resulting Savings Already Included in the Contracto~s BAFO (See Part V.C.1 ), 
100 Percent Workload Credit Is Appropriate If the MHSS Cost-Effectiveness Requirement Is Also Satisfied. For Agreements 
Reflecting Expenditures and Resulting Savings Beyond Those Assumed in the Contracto~s BAFO, the Projected Actual 
Contractor Prom Rate for Resource Sharing (See Part V.C.3) Should Be Approximately Equal to the Proposed Profit Rate 
YES 
(See Explanation at Left) 
for Overall Health Care Costs (Rounding to the Nearest Full Percentage Point) (See Part V.C.4) 
Analysis of Cost-Effectiveness for the Government from the MHSS Perspective 
Projected MTF Expenditures Under RS Agreement (For CHAMPUS Eligibles Only) 
Projected Government Gain in CHAMPUS Under RS Agreement (Net Savings in BAFO Price + 
Savings from 0 Factor Adjustment+ Government Share of Residual CHAMPUS Gain) 
Net Government MHSS Savings Under RS Agreement 
Do Government Gains Exceed Government Expenditures? 
If the Result in Part V.D.3 Is a Positive Value, Then Government Gains Exceed Government Costs 
Bottom Line Comparison of Projected Contractor and Government Gains Under RS Agreement 
Total Projected Net Contractor Gain Under Resource Sharing Agreement 
Total Projected Net Government Gain Under Resource Sharing Agreement 
NOTE: TERMS OF PROPOSED AGREEMENT SHOULD ONLY BE APPROVED IF THE RESPONSES TO PART V.C.5 AND V.D.4 ARE BOTH "YES." 
IF THE RESPONSES TO BOTH QUESTIONS (PARTS V.C.5 AND V.D.4) ARE NOT "YES," THEN THE PROPOSED CONTRACTOR WORKLOAD 
CREDIT SHOULD BE ADJUSTED ON AN ITERATIVE BASIS UNTIL THE PROPOSED AGREEMENT SATISFIES BOTH REQUIREMENTS. 
IF THIS IS NOT POSSIBLE, GIVEN ALL OF THE OTHER INPUT ASSUMPTIONS AGREED UPON BY THE MTF COMMANDER AND THE CONTRACTOR. 
THEN THE PROPOSED RESOURCE SHARING AGREEMENT SHOULD NOT BE APPROVED (UNLESS THE LEAD AGENT DETERMINES THAT THE 












A I B I C I D I E I F 
DETERMINING WHETHER THE PROPOSED RESOURCE SHARING EXPENDITURES ARE 
ALREADY INCLUDED IN THE CONTRACTOR'S AGGREGATE BAFO SPENDING ASSUMPTION 
Contractor's Aggregate Resource 
Sharing Expenditures Assumed in BAFO 
Sum of Projected Resource Sharing 
.!±.]Expenditures for Agreements Already 
~Approved--To Be Supplied by Lead Agent 
16 
Is Proposed Resource Sharing 
lliAgreement Already Included in the Contractor's Aggregate BAFO Spending Assumptions? 
22 
REGION BETA 
OPTION 1 OPTION 2 OPTION 3 OPTION 4 OPTION 5 
$12,855,323 $12,446,990 $13,162,671 $13,999,121 $14,854,106 
$13,000,000 $0 $0 $0 $0 












B L_ c I D 
RESOURCE SHARING FINANCIAL ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
REGION BETA 
Assumed Resource Savings Already Reflected in Proposed Bid Price Assumptions 
Expected Contractor Category 8 Expenditures for CHAMP US Eligibles Under This Resource Sharing Agreement 
Are Proposed Savings Already Included in Contractor's BAFO? 
Assumed Savings:Cost Ratio Used to Develop Resource Sharing Savings Trend Factor 
in Original Bid Price for Categories 1-7 
Expected Savings in Cat. 1-7 for this Agreement, Consistent with Proposed Savings Trend Factor 
and Assumed To Be Already Reflected in Original Bid Price for Categories 1-7 
Net CHAMPUS Savings Assumed To Be Already Reflected in Contractor's BAFO 







A 8 c D E 
23 Ill. Impact of Cat. 1-7 Bid Price Adjustment for 0 Factor 
Note: 0 Factor calculations must be beneficiary-category specific. 
ADD NADD Total 
A. Bid Price Components Unaffected by RS Agreement: 
1. Number of CHAMPUS Eligibles in DCP (for the Region) 78,660 140,490 NA 
2. Number of CHAM PUS Eligibles in Option Period (for the Region) 68,573 137,914 NA 
3. [(M x P x Q) + (M x R x S) + (M x T xU)) for Categories 1-3 Total in Option Period (for the Region) $259 $194 NA 
4. [(M x P x Q) + (M x R x S) + (M x T x U)) for Categories 4-7 Total in Option Period (for the Region) $221 $292 NA 
B. Inpatient Resource Sharing Agreements: Calculation of 0 Factor Impact 
1. NAS % of DCP Inpatient Costs (Input for 0 Factor Formula, for the Region) 52% 27% NA 
- ~ 2. Number of NAS-Equivalents in DCP (Input for 0 Factor Formula, for the Region) 4,812 3,681 NA -00 3 
3. Number of NAS-Equivalents without the Resource Sharing Agreement in Option Period 3,143 4,622 NA (Input for 0 Factor Formula, for the Region) 
4. Inpatient 0 Factor without this Resource Sharing Agreement in Option Period 0.869603544 1.075354362 NA 
5. Number of MTF Admissions of CHAM PUS Eligibles Enabled by the Resource Sharing Agreement in Opti 0 0 NA 
Period (Should Reflect the Number of MTF Admissions Which Would Not Occur in the Absence of the 
Resource Sharing Agreement, According to the Resource Sharing Workload Reporting Guidelines 
Provided in Section J, Attachment 13) 
6. Number of NAS-Equivalents with the Resource Sharing Agreement in Option Period, Before 3,143 4,622 NA 
Contractor Workload Credit 
7. Contractor's Workload Credit for the Resource Sharing Agreement in Option Period 45% 45% NA (Pending Confirmation of Acceptable Worksheet Results) 
8. Number of NAS-Equivalents Credited to Resource Sharing Agreement in Option Period 0 0 NA 
9. Number of NAS-Equivalents with the RS Agreement in Option Period, After Contractor Workload Credit 3,143 4,622 NA 
10. Inpatient 0 Factor with this Resource Sharing Agreement in Option Period 0.869603544 1.075354362 NA 
A B c D E 
661 c. Outpatient Resource Sharing Agreements: Calculation of 0 Factor Impact 
1. CHAMPUS Outpatient Visits in the DCP (Input for 0 Factor Formula, for the Region) 222,499 415,332 NA 
2. MTF Outpatient Visits in DCP (Input for 0 Factor Formula, for the Region) 339,214 650,449 NA 
3. Number of MTF Outpatient Visits without the Resource Sharing Agreement in Option Period 237,505 408,955 NA 
(Input for 0 Factor Formula, for the Region) 
4. Volume Trade-Off Factor for Outpatient Visits Assumed in Contract 1.8 2.8 
5. Outpatient 0 Factor without this Resource Sharing Agreement in Option Period 1.166723147 1.201091634 NA 
6. Number of MTF Outpatient Visits By CHAM PUS Eligibles Enabled by the Resource Sharing Agreement in 525 300 NA 
Option Period (Should Reflect the Number of MTF Outpatient Visits Which Would Not Occur in the Absence 
of the Resource Sharing Agreement, According to the Resource Sharing Workload Reporting Guidelines 
Provided in Section J, Attachment 13) 
7. Number of MTF Outpatient Visits with the Resource Sharing Agreement in Option Period, Before 238,030 409,255 NA 
Contractor Workload Credit 
...... ~ ...... Contractor's Workload Credit for the Resource Sharing Agreement in Option Period \0 7 8. 45% 45% NA 
(Pending Confirmation of Acceptable Worksheet Results) 
9. Number of MTF Outpatient Visits Credited to Resource Sharing Agreement in Option Period 236 135 NA 
10. Number of MTF Outpatient Visits with the RS Agreement in Option Period, After Workload Credit 237,794 409,120 NA 
11. Outpatient 0 Factor with this Resource Sharing Agreement in Option Period 1.165896115 1.200947100 NA 
D. Decrease in Cat. 1-7 Bid Price due to 0 Factor Adjustment, If Any 
1. Inpatient CHAMPUS Costs (Categories 1 to 3) $0 $0 $0 
2. Outpatient CHAM PUS Costs (Categories 4 to 7) $12,519 $5,818 $18,337 
3. Total Change (Categories 1 to 7) $12,519 $5,818 $18,337 
A B c D E 
105 Ill. Impact on Actual Cat. 1-7 CHAMPUS Claims Costs 
A. Impact on Inpatient CHAMPUS Claims Costs ADD NADD Total 
1. Number of MTF Admissions of CHAM PUS Eligibles Enabled by the Resource Sharing Agreement in Opti 0 0 NA 
Period (Should Reflect the Number of MTF Admissions Which Would Not Occur in the Absence of the 
Resource Sharing Agreement, According to the Resource Sharing Workload Reporting Guidelines 
Provided in Section J, Attachment 13) 
2. Assumed VTF for Inpatient Resource Sharing Workload Expected Under this Agreement 1.0 1.0 NA 
3. Number of Admissions Avoided in CHAMPUS 0 0 NA 
4. Average Government Cost Per Unit for Admissions Avoided in CHAMPUS $0 $0 NA 
5. Estimated Categories 1-3 Inpatient CHAMPUS Costs Avoided with Resource Sharing Agreement $0 $0 $0 
-N 0 
B. Impact on Outpatient CHAMPUS Claims Costs ADD NADD To~: 
1. Number of MTF Outpatient Visits By CHAM PUS Eligibles Enabled by the Resource Sharing Agreement in 525 300 
Option Period (Should Reflect the Number of MTF Outpatient Visits Which Would Not Occur in the Absence 
of the Resource Sharing Agreement, According to the Resource Sharing Workload Reporting Guidelines 
Provided in Section J, Attachment 13) 
2. Assumed VTF for Outpatient Resource Sharing Workload Expected Under this Agreement 1.5 1.5 NA 
3. Number of Outpatient Visits Avoided in CHAMP US 350 200 NA 
4. Average Government Cost Per Unit for Outpatient Visits Avoided in CHAMPUS $225 $225 NA 
5. Estimated Categories 4-7 Outpatient CHAMPUS Costs Avoided with Resource Sharing Agreement $78,750 $45,000 $123,750 















Risk Sharing Impact 
Contractor's Resource Sharing Expenditures in Category 8 (For CHAM PUS Eligibles Only) 
Net Decrease in Actual CHAMPUS Costs (Categories 1-7 Costs Avoided Minus Category 8 Costs) 
Net Decrease in CHAMPUS Costs Already Reflected in Contractor's Total Bid Price 
(Includes Effect of Assumed Resource Sharing Expenditures and Savings Trend Factor from BAFO) 
Decrease in Categories 1-7 Bid Price due to 0 Factor Adjustment, If Any 
Residual Gain in CHAMPUS Categories 1-7 Costs To Be Shared 
(Actual Net Decrease in Health Care Costs- Savings in BAFO Price - 0 Factor Adjustment) 
Expected Government Risk Sharing Responsibility Percentage 
(Lead Agent To Provide Guidance with Input from Contractor 
for This Assumption to Ensure Consistency within the Region) 
Expected Contractor Risk Sharing Responsibility Percentage 
(Lead Agent To Provide Guidance with Input from Contractor 
for This Assumption to Ensure Consistency within the Region) 
Resulting Government Gain Sharing Amount 
Resulting Contractor Gain Sharing Amount 
































-, c =r 0 =r E RESULTS OF ANALYSIS: CHECK OF CONTRACTOR WORKLOAD CREDIT AND MHSS COST-EFFECTIVENESS 
Contractor Resource Sharing Workload Credit Assumed In Analysis (Above) 
Contractor's Resource Sharing Expenditures as Percent of Total Expenditures (Contractor+ MTF Marginal) (For Information: Not Used in Worksheet Calculations) 
Analysis of Contractor Profit and Workload Credit: 
Contractor's Resource Sharing Expenditures 
Are These Expenditures and the Resulting Savings Already Reflected in the Contractor's BAFO? 
Projected Actual Net Contractor Gain from Resource Sharing (Risk Sharing Result): 
For Comparison in Judging Reasonable Workload Credit. vs. Profit Rate on Expenditures Only 
See Also Comparison of Contractor vs. Government Gains Under RS Agreement (Below) 
Projected Actual Contractor Resource Sharing Profit as Percent of Resource Sharing Expenditures 








Is Proposed Contractor Workload Credit Appropriate? 
For Agreements Reflecting Expenditures and Resulting Savings Already Included in the Contractor's BAFO (See Part V.C.1 ). 100 Percent Workload Credit is Appropriate If the MHSS Cost-Effectiveness Requirement Is Also Satisfied. For Agreements Reflecting Expend~ures and Resulting Savings Beyond Those Assumed In the Contractor's BAFO, the Projected Actual Contractor Profit Rate for Resource Sharing (See Part V.C.3) Should Be Approximately Equal to the Proposed Profit Rate 
YES 
(See Explanation at Left) 
for Overall Health Care Costs (Rounding to the Nearest Full Percentage__F>oint) _(See Part V.C.4) 
Analysis of Cost-Effectiveness for the Government from the MHSS Perspective 
Projected MTF Expend~ures Under RS Agreement (For CHAMPUS Eligibles Only) 
Projected Government Gain in CHAMPUS Under RS Agreement (Net Savings In BAFO Price + 
Savings from 0 Factor Adjustment+ Government Share of Residual CHAM PUS Gain) 
Net Government MHSS Savings Under RS Agreement 
Do Government Gains Exceed Government Expenditures? 
If the Result in Part V.D.3 Is a Posttlve Value, Then Government Gains Exceed Government Costs 
Bottom Line Comparison of Projected Contractor and Government Gains Under RS Agreement 
Total Projected Net Contractor Gain Under Resource Sharing Agreement 
Total Projected Net Government Gain Under Resource Sharing Agreement 












A I B I C I D I E 
DETERMINING WHETHER THE PROPOSED RESOURCE SHARING EXPENDITURES ARE 
ALREADY INCLUDED IN THE CONTRACTOR'S AGGREGATE BAFO SPENDING ASSUMPTION 
REGION GAMMA 
OPTION 1 OPTION 2 OPTION 3 OPTION 4 
F 
OPTION 5 
Contractor's Aggregate Resource 
!!!_JSharing Expenditures Assumed in BAFO 
$12,855.323 $12,446,990 $13,162,671 $13,999,121 $14,854,106 
11 
Sum of Projected Resource Sharing 
!!J Expenditures for Agreements Already 
!!jApproved--To Be Supplied by Lead Agent 
16 
Is Proposed Resource Sharing 
~Agreement Already Included in the Contractor's Aggregate BAFO Spending Assumptions? 
22 
$1,500,000 $0 $0 $0 $0 











_L_ c~_ 1 o 
RESOURCE SHARING FINANCIAL ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
REGION GAMMA 
Assumed Resource Savings Already Reflected in Proposed Bid Price Assumptions 
Expected Contractor Category 8 Expenditures for CHAMP US Eligibles Under This Resource Sharing Agreement 
Are Proposed Savings Already Included in Contractor's BAFO? 
Assumed Savings:Cost Ratio Used to Develop Resource Sharing Savings Trend Factor 
in Original Bid Price for Categories 1-7 
Expected Savings in Cat. 1-7 for this Agreement, Consistent with Proposed Savings Trend Factor 
and Assumed To Be Already Reflected in Original Bid Price for Categories 1-7 
Net CHAMPUS Savings Assumed To Be Already Reflected in Contractor's BAFO 


























Impact on Actual Cat. 1-7 CHAMPUS Claims Costs 
Impact on Inpatient CHAMPUS Claims Costs 
Number of MTF Admissions of CHAM PUS Eligibles Enabled by the Resource Sharing Agreement in Opti 
Period {Should Reflect the Number of MTF Admissions Which Would Not Occur in the Absence of the 
Resource Sharing Agreement, According to the Resource Sharing Workload Reporting Guidelines 
Provided in Section J, Attachment 13) 
Assumed VTF for Inpatient Resource Sharing Workload Expected Under this Agreement 
Number of Admissions Avoided in CHAMPUS 
Average Government Cost Per Unit for Admissions Avoided in CHAMPUS 
Estimated Categories 1-3 Inpatient CHAMPUS Costs Avoided with Resource Sharing Agreement 
Impact on Outpatient CHAMPUS Claims Costs 
Number of MTF Outpatient Visits By CHAM PUS Eligibles Enabled by the Resource Sharing Agreement in 
Option Period {Should Reflect the Number of MTF Outpatient Visits Which Would Not Occur in the Absence 
of the Resource Sharing Agreement, According to the Resource Sharing Workload Reporting Guidelines 
Provided in Section J, Attachment 13) 
Assumed VTF for Outpatient Resource Sharing Workload Expected Under this Agreement 
Number of Outpatient Visits Avoided in CHAMP US 
Average Government Cost Per Unit for Outpatient Visits Avoided in CHAMPUS 
Estimated Categories 4-7 Outpatient CHAMPUS Costs Avoided with Resource Sharing Agreement 
Estimated Categories 1-7 CHAMPUS Costs Avoided with Resource Sharing Agreement 
c D E 
ADD NADD Total 
0 0 NA 
1.0 1.0 NA 
0 0 NA 
$0 $0 NA 
$0 $0 $0 
ADD NADD Total 
8,000 14,500 NA 
1.1 1.1 NA 
7,273 13,182 NA 
$35 $35 NA 
$254,545 $461,364 $715,909 
$254,545 $461,364 $715,909 
A B c D E 
C. Outpatient Resource Sharing Agreements: Calculation of 0 Factor Impact 
1. CHAMPUS Outpatient Visits in the DCP (Input for 0 Factor Formula, for the Region) 222,499 415,332 NA 
2. MTF Outpatient Visits in DCP (Input for 0 Factor Formula, for the Region) 339,214 650,449 NA 
3. Number of MTF Outpatient Visits without the Resource Sharing Agreement in Option Period 237,505 408,955 NA 
(Input for 0 Factor Formula, for the Region) 
4. Volume Trade-Off Factor for Outpatient Visits Assumed in Contract 1.8 2.8 
5. Outpatient 0 Factor without this Resource Sharing Agreement in Option Period 1.166723147 1.201091634 NA 
6. Number of MTF Outpatient Visits By CHAM PUS Eligibles Enabled by the Resource Sharing Agreement in 8,000 14,500 NA 
Option Period (Should Reflect the Number of MTF Outpatient Visits Which Would Not Occur in the Absence 
of the Resource Sharing Agreement, According to the Resource Sharing Workload Reporting Guidelines 
Provided in Section J, Attachment 13) 
7. Number of MTF Outpatient Visits with the Resource Sharing Agreement in Option Period, Before 245,505 423,455 NA 
Contractor Workload Credit 
-N 
-.....) 
8. Contractor's Workload Credit for the Resource Sharing Agreement in Option Period 100% 100% NAI (Pending Confirmation of Acceptable Worksheet Results) 
I 
9. Number of MTF Outpatient Visits Credited to Resource Sharing Agreement in Option Period 8,000 14,500 NAI 
I 
10. Number of MTF Outpatient Visits with the RS Agreement in Option Period, After Workload Credit 237,505 408,955 NA 
11. Outpatient 0 Factor with this Resource Sharing Agreement in Option Period 1.166723147 1.201091634 NA 
D. Decrease in Cat. 1-7 Bid Price due to 0 Factor Adjustment, If Any 
1. Inpatient CHAMPUS Costs (Categories 1 to 3) $0 $0 $0 
2. Outpatient CHAM PUS Costs (Categories 4 to 7) $0 $0 $0 




















Impact on Actual Cat. 1-7 CHAMPUS Claims Costs 
Impact on Inpatient CHAMPUS Claims Costs 
Number of MTF Admissions of CHAMPUS Eligibles Enabled by the Resource Sharing Agreement in Opti 
Period (Should Reflect the Number of MTF Admissions Which Would Not Occur in the Absence of the 
Resource Sharing Agreement, According to the Resource Sharing Workload Reporting Guidelines 
Provided in Section J, Attachment 13) 
Assumed VTF for Inpatient Resource Sharing Workload Expected Under this Agreement 
Number of Admissions Avoided in CHAM PUS 
Average Government Cost Per Unit for Admissions Avoided in CHAM PUS 
Estimated Categories 1-3 Inpatient CHAMPUS Costs Avoided with Resource Sharing Agreement 
Impact on Outpatient CHAMPUS Claims Costs 
Number of MTF Outpatient Visits By CHAMP US Eligibles Enabled by the Resource Sharing Agreement in 
Option Period (Should Reflect the Number of MTF Outpatient Visits Which Would Not Occur in the Absence 
of the Resource Sharing Agreement, According to the Resource Sharing Workload Reporting Guidelines 
Provided in Section J, Attachment 13) 
Assumed VTF for Outpatient Resource Sharing Workload Expected Under this Agreement 
Number of Outpatient Visits Avoided in CHAM PUS 
Average Government Cost Per Unit for Outpatient Visits Avoided in CHAMP US 
Estimated Categories 4-7 Outpatient CHAMPUS Costs Avoided with Resource Sharing Agreement 
Estimated Categories 1-7 CHAMPUS Costs Avoided with Resource Sharing Agreement 
c D E 
ADD NADD Total 
0 0 NA 
1.0 1.0 NA 
0 0 NA 
$0 $0 NA 
$0 $0 $0 
ADD NADD Total 
8,000 14,500 NA 
1.1 1.1 NA 
7,273 13,182 NA 
$35 $35 NA 
$254,545 $461,364 $715,909 
















Risk Sharing Impact 
Contractor's Resource Sharing Expenditures in Category 8 (For CHAMPUS Eligibles Only) 
Net Decrease in Actual CHAMPUS Costs (Categories 1-7 Costs Avoided Minus Category 8 Costs) 
Net Decrease in CHAMPUS Costs Already Reflected in Contractor's Total Bid Price 
(Includes Effect of Assumed Resource Sharing Expenditures and Savings Trend Factor from BAFO) 
Decrease in Categories 1-7 Bid Price due to 0 Factor Adjustment, If Any 
Residual Gain in CHAMPUS Categories 1-7 Costs To Be Shared 
(Actual Net Decrease in Health Care Costs - Savings in BAFO Price - 0 Factor Adjustment) 
Expected Government Risk Sharing Responsibility Percentage 
(lead Agent To Provide Guidance with Input from Contractor 
for This Assumption to Ensure Consistency within the Region) 
Expected Contractor Risk Sharing Responsibility Percentage 
(lead Agent To Provide Guidance with Input from Contractor 
for This Assumption to Ensure Consistency within the Region) 
Resulting Government Gain Sharing Amount 
Resulting Contractor Gain Sharing Amount 






























I 8 I c I D I E 
RESULTS OF ANALYSIS: CHECK OF CONTRACTOR WORKLOAD CREDIT AND MHSS COST-EFFECTIVENESS 
Contractor Resource Sharing Workload Credit Assumed in Analysis (Above) 
Contractor's Resource Sharing Expenditures as Percent of Total Expenditures (Contractor+ MTF Marginal) 
(For Information; Not Used in Worksheet Calculations) 
Analysis of Contractor Profit and Workload Credit: 
Contractor's Resource Sharing Expenditures 
Are These Expenditures and the Resulting Savings Already Reflected in the Contractor's BAFO? 
Projected Actual Net Contractor Gain from Resource Sharing (Risk Sharing Result): 
For Comparison in Judging Reasonable Workload Credit, vs. Profit Rate on Expenditures Only 
See Also Comparison of Contractor vs. Government Gains Under RS Agreement (Below) 
Projected Actual Contractor Resource Sharing Profit as Percent of Resource Sharing Expenditures 








Is Proposed Contractor Workload Credit Appropriate? 
For Agreements Reflecting Expenditures and Resulting Savings Already Included in the Contractor's BAFO (See Part V.C.1), 
100 Percent Workload Credit is Appropriate If the MHSS Cost-Effectiveness Requirement Is Also Satisfied. For Agreements 
Reflecting Expenditures and Resulting Savings Beyond Those Assumed In the Contractor's BAFO, the Projected Actual 
Contractor Profit Rate for Resource Sharing (See Part V.C.3) Should Be Approximately Equal to the Proposed Profit Rate 
for Overall Health Care Costs (Rounding to the Nearest Full Percentage Point) (See Part V.C.4) 
YES 
(See Explanation at Left) 
Analysis of Cost-Effectiveness for the Government from the MHSS Perspective 
Projected MTF Expenditures Under RS Agreement (For CHAMPUS Eligibles Only) 
Projected Government Gain in CHAMPUS Under RS Agreement (Net Savings In BAFO Price + 
Savings from 0 Factor Adjustment+ Government Share of Residual CHAMPUS Gain) 
Net Government MHSS Savings Under RS Agreement 
Do Government Gains Exceed Government Expenditures? 
If the Result in Part V.D.3 Is a Positive Value, Then Government Gains Exceed Government Costs 
Bottom Line Comparison of Projected Contractor and Government Gains Under RS Agreement 
Total Projected Net Contractor Gain Under Resource Sharing Agreement 
Total Projected Net Government Gain Under Resource Sharing Agreement 
NOTE: TERMS OF PROPOSED AGREEMENT SHOULD ONLY BE APPROVED IF THE RESPONSES TO PART V.C.S AND V.D.4 ARE BOTH "YES." 
IF THE RESPONSES TO BOTH QUESTIONS (PARTS V.C.S AND V.D.4) ARE NOT "YES," THEN THE PROPOSED CONTRACTOR WORKLOAD 
CREDIT SHOULD BE ADJUSTED ON AN ITERATIVE BASIS UNTIL THE PROPOSED AGREEMENT SATISFIES BOTH REQUIREMENTS. 
IF THIS IS NOT POSSIBLE, GIVEN ALL OF THE OTHER INPUT ASSUMPTIONS AGREED UPON BY THE MTF COMMANDER AND THE CONTRACTOR, 
THEN THE PROPOSED RESOURCE SHARING AGREEMENT SHOULD NOT BE APPROVED (UNLESS THE LEAD AGENT DETERMINES THAT THE 
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